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A bstract
My thesis explores issues concerned with delegated asset management and 
their implications for asset prices. The first chapter of my thesis documents 
how the organizational form of a mutual fund affects its investment strategies. 
I show that decentralized funds allocate a greater portion of their capital to 
soft (opaque) information companies than centralized funds. Consistent with 
the inability of centralized organizations to handle soft information, I find that 
decentralized funds are better at investing in soft information companies than 
hierarchical funds. Furthermore, I find that high levels of ownership by decen­
tralized funds predict high future returns for soft information companies. The 
second chapter shows that while fund families may use mutual fund incuba­
tion (the creation and management of a fund before it is offered to the public) 
in an opportunistic fashion, they also seem to use it to foster innovation. I 
document that fund families tend to launch their incubated funds when their 
past performance is high, consistent with a behaviour that aims to exploit the 
convex relationship between past performance and current flows. However, I 
also show that, after their Initial Public Offerings (IPO’s), incubated funds 
tend to hold more illiquid stocks, hold more concentrated portfolios, invest in 
less-popular securities and are better at purchasing stocks than non-incubated 
funds. This difference in investment strategies is due to the incubation period 
as it allows managers to explore different corners of the market without having 
to take into account performance-induced capital flows. I also present evidence
9that, despite their outstanding pre-IPO track records, incubated funds attract 
a smaller share of new-fund capital flows than non-incubated funds. The third 
chapter (joint work with Dr. Mungo Wilson) shows that mutual fund families 
cater to investors’ demand by offering funds with investment styles that are in 
vogue. I also show that this catering exacerbates the ’’dumb money” effect. In 
other words, fund IPOs have a positive effect on the persistence of investment 
style capital flows.
Para Sofia, con mucho amor.
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Chapter 1
Organizational D iseconom ies in 
the M utual Fund Industry
1.1 Introduction
Information collection is a central part of investing. As suggested by several 
economists, the collection of information can ameliorate the adverse selection 
problem faced by investors1. Moreover, it has been argued that the collection 
of information may be influenced by organizational structure. For instance, 
it has been documented that decentralized organizations are better suited at 
processing soft information (i.e. information that is not quantitative in na­
ture and that is difficult to summarize in a numeric score), since this type of 
information can not be transferable within a hierarchy. On the other hand, 
standardization and economies of scale make centralized organizations more 
efficient at producing and processing hard information (information that is 
quantitative in nature). The main objective of this paper is to study the ef­
fect of organizational structure on information collection and investing in the 
mutual fund industry.
1Stiglitz and Weiss (1980) show that asymmetric information may explain why capital 
does not flow to firms with positive net present value projects. Lelan and Pyle (1977), 
Campbell and Kracaw (1980), Diamond (1984), Haubrich (1989) Diamond (1991) describe 
how large institutional creditors can partially overcome the problem of adverse selection by 
producing information about firms and using it in their credit decisions.
12
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Stein (2002) models the effect of organizational design (centralized vs de­
centralized structures) on the collection of information in firms where division 
managers compete for internal funds to finance their projects. In a centralized 
organization, where research and capital allocation are carried out by different 
agents, division managers (research) will know that the only information a 
CEO will use in allocating capital across divisions is information that can be 
credibly transm itt able. This type of information, also known in the literature 
as hard information, is quantitative and objective in nature (i.e. sales growth 
rate of a company over the past 5 years. This, in turn, means that any effort 
exerted in collecting information that can not be credibly transm itt able, or 
soft information (information that can not be easily agreed upon, i.e. honesty 
of a CEO), will go to waste. Division managers will know this ex-ante and will 
re-direct all their efforts to collect hard information. Furthermore, competition 
amongst division managers for limited internal funds will lead them to collect 
as much hard information as possible on their investment projects. This will, 
in turn, translate into the production of vast amounts of hard information. On 
the other hand, in a decentralized organization, research and capital allocation 
will be conducted by the same agent (division managers collect information on 
projects and decide how to allocate capital). In this case, division managers 
have the incentive to collect as much (hard and soft) information as possible 
on their investment prospects in order to minimize the adverse selection prob­
lem. Stein shows that if all information about investment projects is hard, 
centralized organizations have an advantage over decentralized firms in their 
ability to  distribute capital across divisions within the organization. On the 
other hand, if all information available about investment opportunities is soft, 
decentralized organizations will have superior fund allocation across projects 
than centralized firms due to their ability to collect and use soft information.
My findings are consistent with Stein’s model. I document that the level of 
centralization of a mutual fund’s organizational structure positively covaries 
with the degree with which a fund invests in hard information companies 
(companies for which most of the information is hard). In other words, as
14
the organizational structure changes from decentralized to centralized, so do 
the incentives to collect hard over soft information. This explains the larger 
portfolio tilt of centralized funds towards hard information companies. I also 
exploit the difference in the ability to collect and use soft and hard infor­
mation of two different organizational forms (decentralized and centralized) 
by constructing buy-and-hold self-financing trading strategies that yield posi­
tive risk-adjusted returns. For instance, a self-financing buy-and-hold trading 
strategy that buys a basket of soft information stocks held by decentralized 
funds and short-sells a basket of soft information stocks held by centralized 
funds every quarter, produces risk-adjusted returns between 49 and 64 bps per 
month (6% and 7.95% per year respectively). Moreover, consistent with the 
hypothesis that decentralized organizations have a unique ability to collect and 
use soft information, I illustrate that high levels of ownership by decentralized 
funds predict high future returns for soft information companies. For instance 
a one standard deviation in the intensity of investment by decentralized funds 
in a soft information stock, predicts an additional future return of 17 bps per 
month.
The distinction between soft and hard information has been studied before 
in the banking literature, with particular emphasis on the incorporation of soft 
and hard information in different lending technologies (i.e. credit scoring, re­
lationship lending) by different organizational forms (large vs. small banks)2. 
One of the main conclusions in this strand of the literature is that large banks 
tend to be at a disadvantage when lending to small businesses. The reason 
given is that large banks are very centralized and small businesses tend to be 
informationally opaque (they mostly produce soft information). The disad­
vantage emerges from the fact that centralized organizations are ill-suited to 
use soft information 3. However, Berger Rosen and Udell (2007) argue that
2 For a more detailed discussion on the subject see the papers surveyed in Berger Rosen 
and Udell (2007).
3However, Berger and Udell (2006) have pointed out that large banks (hierarchies) may 
have developed lending technologies that allow them to lend to opaque businesses (soft 
information companies). Examples of these lending technologies are small business credit 
scoring asset-based lending, factoring, fixed assets lending and leasing (See Berger and Udell 
(2006)).
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past empirical research in this area is inconclusive since some variables of in­
terest were not considered. Therefore the evidence in the banking literature 
on the effects of organizational form on the collection and usage of information 
is mixed.
Actively managed US equity mutual funds provide an ideal environment 
to analyze the effects of organizational diseconomies in information collection 
and capital allocation for several reasons. Firstly, investing is a task that is 
information intensive. Secondly, due to disclosure requirements, it is possible 
to measure fund organizational characteristics, and the information opaqueness 
(hard vs. soft information) of funds’ holdings. In this paper, I construct 
information and organizational complexity scores to measure the softness of 
the information generated by stocks and the degree of centralization of mutual 
funds.
Chen et al (2004) look at the issue of organizational diseconomies in the 
delegated asset management industry. They examine a particular cross-section 
of the data, September 1997, and find that small and solo-managed funds are 
more likely to invest in and are better at choosing local stocks (companies 
whose headquarters are geographically close to the fund’s main offices) than 
large and non-solo managed funds. They present this evidence as an indica­
tion tha t decentralized funds are better at collecting and using soft informa­
tion companies. However, they do not look at the other implications of Stein 
(2002), namely whether centralized funds tilt their portfolios to hard informa­
tion stocks. Moreover, their measure of organizational complexity overlooks 
the effect of fund families in the way member funds operate. For instance, 
Gaspar Massa and Matos (2006) and Cici Gibson and Moussawi (2006), doc­
ument th a t fund families have the incentives and mechanisms to influence the 
capital allocation of its member funds. This creates the kind of separation 
between research and decision making found in centralized organizations. In 
a concurrent project, Massa and Zhang (2009) study how the organizational 
structure of an asset management company affects its strategies and perfor­
mance. Using a sample of US fixed income mutual and insurance-managed
16
funds, the authors show that more hierarchical structures invest less in firms 
located close to them and deliver lower performance.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the hypotheses. Sec­
tion 3 describes the data, section 4 presents the results and section 5 concludes.
1.2 Theory and Hypothesis Construction
1.2.1 Soft and Hard Information
Petersen (2004) presents a detailed characterization of hard and soft infor­
mation in finance. Hard Information is the kind of information that can be 
easily reduced to numbers. Examples of hard information in finance are fi­
nancial statements, credit history, and stock returns. On the other hand, one 
can think of soft information as information that can not be completely sum­
marized in a numeric score. Examples of soft information in finance can be 
opinions and rumours. Due to its quantitative nature, hard information can 
be easily collected, stored and transmitted (these characteristics also make it 
difficult to contain). A second dimension used by Petersen to characterize in­
formation is the way in which it is collected. The collection of hard information 
need not be personal. Therefore, the collection process can be at arms length, 
automated and standardized. However, it places restrictions on what can be 
collected. W ith soft information, the context under which it is collected and 
the collector of the information are part of the information itself. For instance, 
if I say that the manager of a firm has great business acumen, the information 
depends on my definition of business acumen. One of the advantages of hard 
information is that it can lower production costs through standardization and 
automatization. Hard information is easy to store as the information does 
not depend on who collected it. This means that the information remains in 
an organization even if the agent who collected it leaves the firm. However, 
collection of hard information also leads to a loss of information which in some 
contexts can be quite important (i.e. venture capital, where most of the infor­
mation about investments is soft). Moreover, the fact that hard information is
17
difficult to contain can keep managers from fully collecting informational rents 
(i.e. in the case of equity investing, it reduces the ability an investor has to 
earn abnormal returns).4
1.2.2 H ypotheses construction
Motivated by Stein (2002), I conjecture that the organizational form of a mu­
tual fund affects managers’ incentives to collect information. This should be 
reflected in the kind of stocks that managers pick and in their ability to choose 
stocks with different degrees of information ” softness” .
Hypothesis 1. The level of mutual fund centralization should positively co- 
vary with the tendency to hold a greater proportion of hard information com­
panies.
Hypothesis 1 follows from the fact that incentives to collect information are 
affected by organizational form. As stated before, fund managers that operate 
in centralized funds (where research and decision making are conducted by 
different agents), know that they will not be able to credibly transmit soft 
information. Ex-ante, they decide to steer their efforts towards collecting more 
hard information. Therefore, as the organizational structure becomes more 
hierarchical, funds increase the share of resources allocated to hard information 
stocks.
Hypothesis 2. Decentralized (centralized) funds are better than centralized 
(decentralized) funds at investing in soft (hard) information companies.
If decentralized funds are better suited than centralized funds at collecting 
and using soft information, they should have a superior ability to invest in 
soft information stocks than centralized funds. On the other hand, centralized 
funds should be better than decentralized funds at investing in hard infor­
mation companies since they are better at gathering and incorporating hard
4Petersen also notes that soft information can be hardened and cites credit scoring as 
an example. In addition, he presents examples of hardening of information (Mercantile 
Agency, R.G.Dun, and Bradstreets in the 1840) and explains how the evolution of financial 
markets over the last forty years has been in part a replacement of soft information with 
hard information as the basis for financial transactions
18
information.
Hypothesis 3. Decentralized funds’ ownership of soft information stocks 
should forecast these stocks ’ future returns
Since decentralized funds are able to collect and incorporate soft informa­
tion in their investment decisions, high decentralized funds’ ownership in soft 
information stocks should forecast higher expected returns since high owner­
ship should reflect the collection of positive information on a stock.
1.3 D ataset Construction and M ethodology
1.3.1 Information variables and score construction
The information score I construct aims at measuring the information ’’softness” 
of a firm and the extent to which information about a company has been 
hardened. The score is based on four variables. The first two variables, market 
capitalization (SIZE) and age (AGE), measure the information softness of a 
firm. These variables have been previously used in the banking literature and 
the main idea is that information available about older and larger firms tends to 
be harder than information generated by younger and smaller companies. The 
other two variables, number of analyst forecasts (NUM EST) and institutional 
ownership (OWN), measure the extent to which information about a company 
has been hardened. The basic premise is that these two variables measure the 
level of due diligence on a company. For instance, it is plausible to think that 
there is more hard information about a company followed by 50 analysts than 
by a company without analysts’ coverage.
1.3.1.1 Information Score
The construction of the information score for each stock is based on the rank­
ing of its information variables. To try and purge the size effect from the other 
information variables (all other variables are highly correlated with size), I 
orthogonalize institutional ownership, age and number of estimates with re-
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spect to size. I conduct this orthogonalization by regressing age, institutional
ownership and number of estimates on size, similar to Hong et al (2000) and
Nagel (2005). The orthogonalized values of these variables are the error term 
of these regressions. Since institutional ownership is bounded between 0 and 
1, it is necessary to transform the variable so that it maps to the real line. I 
perform the following logit transformation,
(  O W N  \L og it(O W N )=  l o g ( T- ^ )  (1.1)
where the values below 0.0001 and above 0.9999 are replaced with 0.0001 
and 0.9999 respectively. The information variable residuals are calculated by 
regressing the information variables on Log Size and squared Log size. On 
average, across all quarters, I find the following relations:
Logit(OWN) = —7.31 4- 1.68 Logsize — 0.09 Logsize2 +  e (1.2)
NUMEST  =  2.13 — 1.90Logsize -1- OASLogsize2 +  e (1.3)
Log AGE  =  4.44 — 0.25Logsize +  0.035Logsize2 +  e (1.4)
The basic procedure to calculate the information score is as follows. Each 
quarter, I take the universe of NYSE stocks and rank them in 20 groups by size 
and residual age. I use the NYSE size and residual age rank cut-off points to 
rank stocks held by mutual funds. I also rank stocks held by mutual funds in 
20 groups by residual institutional ownership and residual number of analysts’ 
estimates. For each stock, I then calculate an aggregate information variable 
by summing up the ranks of the four variables for each stock. For instance, 
if a stock belongs to size group 1, residual age group 2, residual institutional 
ownership group 2 and residual number of analyst estimates group 10, the 
aggregate information variable equals 15. Next, I group these stocks by this 
aggregate information variable in deciles. The information score will be equal 
to the aggregate information variable decile.
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1.3.2 M utual Fund Variables and Hierarchy Score
The main objective of the hierarchy score is to measure the organizational com­
plexity of a fund. As mentioned earlier, there are two dimensions to consider, 
the centralization of tasks within the fund and the organizational complexity 
of the fund family to which the fund belongs. To measure the level of orga­
nizational complexity within the fund, I use is the number of managers that 
control the asset allocation (NUM MGRS) and net assets under management 
(AUM). As far as number of mangers, the premise is tha t funds with many 
managers will tend to be team-managed. This, in turn, causes managers to 
decide on an asset allocation based on consensus by sharing, and thus transfer­
ring, information with other agents. Regarding net assets under management, 
the main idea is that larger organizations are more hierarchical, since large 
organizations tend to centralize activities. This variable has also been used in 
Chen et al (2004) to measure the organizational complexity of mutual funds. 
The third and fourth variables I use are the number of funds (NUM FUNDS) 
and the total assets under management in actively managed US equity funds 
(FAM SIZE) of the family a fund belongs to. These variables are motivated by 
papers in fund cross-subsidization and fund proliferation (Massa (2003) and 
Gaspar Massa Matos (2006)). The idea is that maximizing fee income at the 
family level is different from maximizing fee income at the fund level. This will 
lead families to cross-subsidize funds that are the most likely to benefit from 
the convex relationship between past performance and current net flows docu­
mented in Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998). Families 
will also try  to enhance the performance of funds that maximize the positive 
spill over effect that a top-performing fund has on the its member funds’ net 
flows (Nanda et al (2004)). Therefore fund families have incentives to cross- 
subsidize fund returns in other to maximize their own income fee. As such, it 
is reasonable to believe that the asset allocation of a fund will be influenced by 
its family. This creates the separation between research and fund allocation 
mentioned in Stein (2002).
21
1.3.2.1 Hierarchy Score
As indicated above, the variables Number of Funds, Family Size and AUM are 
highly and positively correlated. Therefore a hierarchy score based on the raw 
values of the hierarchy variables would not provide much extra information. 
For instance ranking funds by AUM would produce a very similar ranking if 
funds are ranked by Family size. I therefore, orthogonalize the number of funds 
with respect to AUM. I also orthogonalize Family Size with respect to AUM 
and Number of Funds. On average, across all quarters, I find the following 
relations:
L ogN U M F U N D S  =  1.64 +  Q.QULogA UM + QMZLogA UM2 +  e (1.5)
L o g F A M S IZ E  =  2.04 +  OAOLogAUM +  OMQALogAUM2 
+1.81LogNUMFUNDS -  0.03ALogNUMFunds2 +  e
Each quarter, I rank funds by AUM, residual number family funds, and 
residual family size in quintiles. I calculate an aggregate hierarchy variable by 
summing up these rankings and the number of managers (which takes values 
from one to five). For instance, if a fund belongs to AUM group 1, residual 
number of funds group 2, residual family size group 2 and it has 3 managers, 
the aggregate hierarchy variable equals 8. Each quarter, I rank funds by this 
aggregate hierarchy variable in deciles. The hierarchy score will be equal to 
its aggregate hierarchy variable decile.
1.3.3 D ata
I construct my sample of US actively managed equity funds in four steps 
using the CRSP Survivor-Bias Free U.S. Mutual Fund Database (fund char­
acteristics) and from the Thompson Financial Mutual Fund Database (fund 
holdings). First, index funds are filtered out from the CRSP Survivor-Bias
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Free U.S. Mutual Fund Database. Secondly, we eliminate funds (FUNDNO’S) 
that have reporting gaps of more than 12 months from the Thompson Finan­
cial Mutual Fund Database (S13)5. Thirdly, we exclude funds that on average 
do not hold at least 80% of NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ common stocks from the 
Thompson Financial Mutual Fund Database (S13). Lastly, we merge these two 
datasets by using the MFLINKS provided by WRDS. The number of shares 
own by a fund on a particular issue are corrected and expressed as of the date 
of disclosure6.
Data on stock returns and prices are from the Center for Research in Se­
curity Prices (CRSP) Monthly Stocks File for NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ 
stocks. I eliminate closed-end funds, real estate investment trusts (REIT), 
American Depository Receipts (ADR), foreign companies, primes, and scores. 
I exclude stocks below the 20th NYSE size percentile from the tests that look 
at stocks returns due to the well-documented asset-pricing anomalies in small 
stocks (Griffin and Lemmon (2002)). Market capitalization is defined as the 
product between share price and shares outstanding. Age is defined as the 
number of months that a security is present in the CRSP Monthly File. Data 
on institutional holdings are obtained from the Thomson Financial Institu­
tional Holdings (13F) database. I extract quarterly holdings from the first 
quarter of 1993 to the last quarter of 2006. I calculate the share of institu­
tional ownership by summing the stock holdings of all reporting institutions 
for each stock in each quarter. Stocks that are on CRSP, but without any 
reported institutional holdings, are assumed to have zero institutional owner­
ship7. The number of analysts’ estimates is calculated using I/B /E /S . At the 
end of a company’s fiscal year, I count the maximum number of one-year EPS
5 These funds are suspect as Thompson usually recycles unique fund identifiers. See 
WRDS User’s Guide to Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund and Investment Company Common 
Stock Holdings Databases (July 2008)
6Portfolio holdings are collected every quarter (vintages). If a fund has not disclosed 
holdings (because it was late or because it was not supposed to), the data provider fills 
in ’’missing quarters” by carrying forward the holdings of the prior quarter adjusting for a 
range of corporate events (i.e. Stock splits). For more information, see Wermers (1999) and 
Gompers and Metrick (2001)
7The number of shares owned by an institutional investor are also corrected by the late- 
filer problem described above.
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estimates that were outstanding during the fiscal year in question. NUM EST 
is the maximum number of one-year EPS estimates in the most recent fiscal 
year.
As stock return predictors, I use book-to-market (B/M), firm-level volatility 
(VOL), and turnover (TURN). The book value of equity in the nominator of 
B/M  is taken from the Compustat Database, and it is defined as in Daniel 
and Titman (2006). At the end of each quarter t, we calculate B/M  as the 
book value of equity from the most recent fiscal year-end that is preceding 
quarter-end t  by at least six months divided by the market value of equity at 
the end of quarter t. Consistent with Fama and French (1993), I exclude firms 
with negative book values. Returns on stocks are obtained from CRSP and are 
corrected for delisting biases as suggested by Shumway (1997) and Shumway 
and Warther (1999)
Organizational characteristics of mutual funds are taken from the CRSP 
Survivor-Bias-Free US Mutual Fund Database. I identify all share classes 
issued by a mutual fund using the MFLINKS provided by WRDS and calculate 
the mutual fund characteristics at the fund level, not at the share class level. 
The sample starts in the first quarter of 1993 and ends in the last quarter of 
2006. I calculate the number of managers by counting the different names in 
the database’s manager field. The funds in my sample have a maximum of 5 
names in the database manager filed. However, for some funds, the manager 
field is set to ’’Team Managed” . If this is the case, I set the variable ’’number 
of managers” equal to five. Assets under management equals the total TNA 
of the fund’s share classes. The number of actively managed US equity funds 
per family is calculated at the end of each quarter. The family size variable is 
the sum of all actively managed US equity funds’ TNA offered by a family.
1.3.4 Summary Statistics
Table 1.1 presents some summary statistics on the variables used to construct 
the information score (Size, Age, Number of Analyst Estimates and Institu­
tional Ownership). It also contains summary statistics on stock return predic­
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tors book-to-market (B/M, its natural logarithm), firm-level volatility (VOL), 
and turnover (TURN). All statistics are calculated cross-sectionally each quar­
ter and are then averaged across time. These statistics are calculated for stocks 
held by mutual funds. A few points a noteworthy. First, it is important to 
note the strong positive correlation between size and all other information vari­
ables. This is the reason why purging the size effect from the other information 
variables is important when constructing the score. Otherwise the information 
score would only capture variation in market capitalization of stocks in my 
sample. The information score (INFO) positively correlates with all the infor­
mation variables as expected. The information score also covaries negatively 
with past volatility (VOL), and performance (RET12), and positively with 
liquidity (TURN) and book-to-market ratio (Log BM). In order to better un­
derstand the information score, I also analyze the returns of each of its deciles. 
Table 1.2 describes the risk-adjusted excess returns of value weighted portfolios 
of stocks in each information score group and their loadings on a set of factors. 
We can see that the main facts from the correlation structure in Table 1.1 are 
reflected in this table as well. For instance, we can see that the portfolio of 
stocks with information score equal to zero (INFO =  0) load more on SMB 
(smaller companies), UMD (momentum stocks) LIQ (Illiquid stocks) and ST 
REV (short-term reversal stocks) and less on HML (high book-to-market com­
panies) than stocks in the information score equal to nine (INFO =  9). There 
also seems to be a negative difference between the risk-adjusted excess returns 
of the stocks in the bottom and top deciles of the information score, albeit the 
statistical significance is not very high.
Table 1.3 presents some summary statistics on the variables used to con­
struct the hierarchy score and on other mutual fund variables of interest. We 
can see tha t the number of managers is not highly correlated with any other 
hierarchy variable. However, NUM FUNDS, AUM and Log FAM SIZE are 
highly correlated. The hierarchy score covaries positively with all hierarchy 
variables and with the value-weighted information score of each fund. This 
is the first sign that centralized funds tilt their portfolios towards hard infor­
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mation companies. It is also important to note that the correlation between 
the hierarchy score (HIERARCHY) and a concentration measure (W) is neg­
ative. In other words, centralized funds tend to be less concentrated that 
decentralized funds. The hierarchy score also covaries positively with fund age 
which indicates that young funds tend to be less hierarchical. In order top 
better understand the hierarchy score, I analyze the return characteristics of 
each hierarchy quintile. Table 1.4 describes the risk-adjusted excess returns of 
AUM-weighted portfolios of funds in each hierarchy score quintile. There is 
a negative difference between the risk-adjusted excess returns of the portfolio 
of funds in the bottom and top quintile of the hierarchy score distribution. 
Moreover, the excess return of decentralized funds (HIERARCHY =  1) seems 
to load more on the SMB factor than centralized funds (HIERARCHY =  5). 
Other than that, the returns of the bottom and top quintiles of the hierarchy 
score seem to load very similarly on other factors.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Determ inants of information score
My first hypothesis indicates that centralized mutual funds will allocate a 
greater share of their resources to hard information companies. In order to 
determine whether centralized funds tend to invest in the higher spectrum of 
the information score, I calculate the value-weighted average information score 
of all holdings in a fund’s portfolio. This measures the extent to which funds 
are allocated to information companies in the top of the information score 
distribution.
Table 1.5 regresses the value weighted average information score on dum­
mies for each hierarchy score quintile and on control variables. I control for 
(self-reported) investment styles and time heterogeneity by adding investment 
style and time dummies. Furthermore, net flows can also have an impact in the 
value-weighted average information score. For instance, if a fund experiences 
high net flows, it will have to allocate the new funds rather quickly as their
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investment styles may not allow the fund to hold cash reserves above a certain 
threshold. As pointed out in Pollet and Wilson (2006) and Lou (2009), funds 
tend to scale their holdings asymmetrically depending upon whether they ex­
perience inflows or redemptions. Therefore, net flows should affect portfolio 
holdings of existing positions and thus the value weighted average information 
score. I also control for current quarterly returns and portfolio concentration 
(average portfolio weight). The first column regresses the average information 
score on the hierarchy dummies based on the contemporaneous hierarchy score 
(LAG=0). We can see that as a fund increases its organizational complexity, 
the information score increases monotonically. For instance, the difference be­
tween the average information score of funds with hierarchy score equal to one 
(decentralized fund) and funds with hierarchy score equal to five (centralized 
fund) is 0.219 or 3.3% of the sample average. The effect is also statistically 
significant.
One of the potential problems of this specification is the difficulty to es­
tablish causality. Hypothesis 1 indicates that the degree of centralization of 
a fund (hierarchy score) should have an effect on the type of stocks held in 
its portfolio (i.e. soft vs hard information stocks). However the tests above 
do not rule out that the effect is the other way around, i.e. the average infor­
mation ’’softness” of stocks held in a mutual fund portfolio has an effect on 
a fund’s organizational complexity. For instance, one could argue that funds 
decide to concentrate in a sub-set of stocks (i.e. soft information companies) 
and then decide on a hierarchy structure. This seems unlikely for two reasons. 
Firstly, the tests are motivated by a theory based on the incentives to collect 
information provided by different organizational structures. In other words, 
theory supports the causal relationship between organizational structure and 
information collection explored here. Secondly, fund families cater to investors’ 
demand by supplying funds with investment styles that are in vogue (Garavito 
and Wilson (2009)). This catering takes places regardless of the information 
score of an investment style. However, to partially address these concerns, I 
regress the contemporaneous average information score on hierarchy dummies
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based on past hierarchy score. The results are shown in the second (LAG =  6 
Months) and third (LAG =  12 months) columns. The results are very similar 
to those in the first specification.
1.4.1.1 Robustness - New Funds Information Score
An alternative way to explore the robustness of the results above is to look at 
organizational variables and future information scores of funds that have been 
launched during the sample. This test clearly identifies the effect we want to 
study since, prior to the launch of a fund, no investments are made (i.e. no 
information score) but an organizational structure is put in place (i.e. number 
of managers running the fund) or inherited (i.e. number of funds in the family). 
These allows us to better identify the effect of organizational structure in a 
sub-sample of newly launched mutual funds.
To this end, I regress the information score of newly launched funds twelve 
months after their IPO’s on two organizational variables 8. These organi­
zational variables are the number of investment managers running the fund 
(NUM MGRS, fund level variable), and the number of equity funds in the 
fund’s family (LOG FUNDS, family level variable) just before their IPO. Fur­
ther I add controls which are measured concurrently with the information score 
(12 months after fund’s IPO). I do not include the hierarchy score due to data 
restrictions on the organizational structure of funds at the time of their IPO. 
Moreover, the size of newly launched funds is small and hence, the hierarchy 
score of these funds will tend to be very similar. The results are found in Table 
1.6. As we can see both variables, positively covary with future observations of 
information score. In other words, the more hierarchical a fund is at inception, 
the more it will tend to allocate capital to stocks in the higher spectrum of the 
information score. These results corroborate the findings of Table 1.5.
8The data comes from Garavito (2008).
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1.4.2 Difference in the ability to collect and use soft and 
hard information
1.4.2.1 Value-weighted trading strategy
Hypothesis 2 states that decentralized (centralized) funds should better at 
investing in soft (hard) information stocks than centralized (decentralized) 
funds. In order to test this hypothesis, I construct a self-financing trading 
strategy tha t exploits the difference in ability of decentralized and centralized 
funds to collect and use soft and hard information. In order to test the in­
sights of Stein’s model, I define soft information stocks as those that belong 
to the bottom decile of the information score distribution (i.e. information 
score distribution =  1). Stocks that are in the top decile of the distribution 
(information score =  10) are labelled as ’’hard information stocks” . I apply 
a similar strategy with the organizational complexity of funds. Funds in the 
bottom quintile of the hierarchy score (hierarchy score =  1) are called decen­
tralized funds and funds in the top quintile of the distribution (hierarchy score 
=  5) are called centralized funds. From the cross-section of stocks held by 
mutual funds, I identify the set of soft information stocks held by centralized 
and decentralized mutual funds respectively. The first self-financing trading 
strategy takes a long position in a portfolio made of soft information compa­
nies held by decentralized funds at each quarter-end date. This purchase is 
financed by short selling a portfolio composed of soft information stocks held 
by centralized funds. The portfolio weights of each portfolio trade (long and 
short portfolios) are proportional to the market capitalization of each stock. 
The return of this self-financing trading strategy is measured every month and 
rebalanced every quarter. The results are summarized in Table 1.7. Panel A 
shows the returns on this trading strategy and on its long and short portfolio 
trades. The risk-adjusted excess return for the long side of the trade is positive 
and for the short side is negative with low levels of statistical significance. The 
return on the strategy is positive and economically significance (49 bps per 
month or 6% per year). It is important to note that these returns are orthogo­
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nal to passive benchmarks (factors) that carry positive premia. I also include 
a soft-information factor, which tracks the excess return of a value-weighted 
portfolio of the soft information stocks held by mutual funds (SOFT). This 
ensures that the trading strategy is neutral with respect to the information 
score. These results show that there is a positive difference in the ability to 
collect and use soft information between decentralized and centralized funds.
Similarly, I implement a self-financing trading strategy that aims at ex­
ploiting the better provision of incentives to collect hard information that 
centralized funds offer. As before, the trading strategy consists of buying a 
value-weighted portfolio of hard information stocks held by centralized funds 
financed by short-selling a value-weighted portfolio hard information compa­
nies held by decentralized funds. I keep track of the monthly returns of the 
self-financing trading strategy, and I rebalance it every quarter. Panel B shows 
the results for the second trading strategy. As one can see, the strategy deliv­
ers returns that are very small and not statistically different from zero. The 
failure to find a positive alpha, and hence a positive difference in collecting 
and using hard information between these two organizational forms, can be 
due to several reasons. Firstly, hard information can be easily purchased. If 
outsourcing the production of hard information is cheaper than collecting it, 
then decentralized and centralized funds are likely to purchase the same infor­
mation. In this case, there won’t be any difference in the ability to generate 
hard information and, hence, a trading strategy as the one proposed above, 
would yield zero expected returns. Secondly, since hard information is easy to 
transmit, it is also difficult to contain. This feature reduces the likelihood that 
managers earn positive risk-adjusted returns by collecting hard information 
since, once a piece of information has been harden, it can be transmitted out­
side the fund (i.e. through employee turnover, communication with research 
analysts, etc.).
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1.4.2.2 Investment-intensity trading strategy
The degree by which a fund loads on a holding should indicate the fund’s 
managers beliefs about the holding’s future performance. For example, if a 
manager strongly believes that IBM stock returns will be high, the manager 
will overweight this security in its portfolio. Likewise, if a manager is not very 
confident about the future performance of a long position, it is likely that the 
manager will underweight it. Therefore, a more direct test of relative perfor­
mance of centralized and decentralized funds is to incorporate this information 
in the trading strategy. Consequently, I redefine the portfolio weights of the 
trading strategies to reflect the aggregate beliefs of managers in each orga­
nizational structure. The new weights are based on the average ’’investment 
intensity” that each organizational structure assigns to each stock. In the spirit 
of Cohen Polk and Silli (2010), I define the ’’investment intensity” of a fund on 
a holding, as the ratio between the fund’s portfolio weight of that holding and 
the fund’s average portfolio weight. A large and positive ratio indicates that 
the fund is very confident about the positive future performance of the hold­
ing. In contrast, a small ratio indicates that the fund’s management team is 
not as bullish on a position. I calculate the aum-weighted average ’’investment 
intensity” for all the soft and hard information stocks held by decentralized 
and centralized funds respectively. I then normalize the average ’’investment 
intensity” of all the holdings in each of the trading strategies’ long and short 
portfolios. I used the normalized aum-weighted ’’investment intensity” as the 
new portfolio weights. For instance, suppose that there are only two decentral­
ized funds (A and B) with three and four million dollars of AUM respectively. 
Further, assume that funds A and B both invest in soft information companies 
C and D with investment intensity on C of 2 and 0.5 and investment intensity 
on D of 0.2 and 0.4 respectively. Therefore, the long portfolio trade of the soft 
information strategy would invest 0.78% and 0.22% of each dollar in stocks C 
and D respectively9.
9The AUM-weighted intensity of investment for C and D are |2  +  |0 .5  =  1.14 and 
|0 .2 +  |0 .4  =  0.31 respectively. Therefore, invest t 31 =  0.78% in C and t 31 =
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Panel A of Table 1.8 presents the return of the trading strategy based on 
soft information stocks and its long and short side. The risk-adjusted excess 
return for the long and short side of the trade are positive and negative re­
spectively. Compared to the previous table, the statistical and economical 
significance of the short side is larger. This shows the inability of centralized 
funds to deal with soft information. For the long side of the trade, the alpha is 
positive but the statistical significance is not strong. The risk-adjusted return 
on the strategy is positive and economically significance (64 bps per month or 
7.95% per year). This provides further evidence that there is a positive dif­
ference in the ability to collect and use soft information of two organizational 
forms. Panel B, shows the trading strategy based on hard information com­
panies. The results are very similar to those of Table 1.7. The risk-adjusted 
return of the trading strategy is very close to zero.
1.4.2.3 Investment-intensity trading strategy: Overlap holdings only
A better test to check whether there is a difference in the ability of using 
and collecting information of different organizational structures is to run the 
trading strategy above using holdings that overlap in both sides of the strategy. 
This will compare how different organizational structures invest in the same 
(hard or soft information) companies. If there is a difference as measured by 
the risk-adjusted return of the strategy, it will indicate that one organization 
structure is better that the other one in collecting and using a particular kind of 
information (hard or soft information). The results are presented in Table 1.9. 
Each portfolio trade has the same holdings but their portfolio weights depend 
on the average intensity of investment as defined in the previous sub-section. 
Panel A presents the results for the strategy that employs soft information 
companies only. The results are very similar to those from Table 1.8. We 
can see tha t the strategy delivers positive risk-adjusted returns of up to 72 
bps per month (9% per year). We observe that the main contributor to this 
return is the short side of the trade (portfolio of soft information companies
0.22% and in D
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held by centralised funds), as the risk-adjusted return of this portfolio trade 
is -57 bps per month (-7 % per year). The strategy does not load significantly 
in any of the risk factors and has a low R2. Panel B shows the results for the 
strategy based on hard information companies. As before, we see a positive 
difference between centralized and decentralized funds when investing in hard 
information companies, albeit, the difference is very small and not statistically 
significant. This test shows that the results presented in Table 1.8 are not due 
to a few non-overlapping holdings, or the number of holdings in each portfolio 
trade.
1.4.2.4 Hard information trading strategies: Ability to purchase 
hard information and benchmarking needs
As stated before, if outsourcing the production of hard information is cheaper 
than its collection, then decentralized and centralized funds are likely to sub­
contract its collection. If this is the case, it is then likely that both types of 
funds get exposed to the same set of information. Hence, it would be expected 
to observe that centralized and decentralized funds held a large number of hard 
information companies in common. Outsourcing the collection of information 
can therefore diminish the competitive advantage that hierarchical organiza­
tions have in collecting hard information. This would explain why the alpha 
in the trading strategy for hard information companies, while positive, is very 
close to zero. Another reason may be that hard information companies are 
held for non-alpha generating reasons. For instance, suppose that funds invest 
part of their capital to track a benchmark (i.e. S&P 500). If hard information 
companies tend to be constituents of a widely held index, then it is natu­
ral to expect that the trading strategy proposed above for hard information 
companies, will measure the ability to collect and use hard information and 
benchmark tracking activities of some organizational forms. To address this 
two points, I modify the portfolio trades in Table 1.8. In order to see whether 
highly researched companies are driving the results in the hard information 
trading strategy, I eliminate them from the portfolio trades. I do this by cal­
33
culating the median of the residual of number of analysts’ estimates for each 
portfolio trade in the hard information strategy of Table 1.8. Next, I eliminate 
the holdings tha t are above their respective median from each portfolio trade 
and run the same strategy as in Table 1.8. The results are summarized in 
Panel A of Table 1.10. The alpha of the short side of the trade (DECEN­
TRALIZED) is negative. This is in contrasts to previous tables, where the 
alpha was positive. The alpha of the spread is positive (12 bps per month 
or 1.5% annual) and statistically significant. This shows that if the strategy 
concentrates in hard information companies in the lower range of analyst cov­
erage the strategy delivers positive risk-adjusted returns. This supports the 
idea that the outsourcing of information collection will affect the result of the 
strategy for hard information companies because it diminishes the advantage 
that centralized funds have. The other possible refinement to the strategy is by 
eliminating stocks that may be bought to track a benchmark such as a widely 
held index. I do this by eliminating S&P 500 constituents from each portfolio 
trade in the hard information strategy. Panel B of Table 1.10 presents the 
results. Similar to Panel A, the short side of the trade presents a negative 
risk-adjusted excess return. The spread of the strategy is positive and larger 
that in previous tables. In general, the results from this table explain why 
the hard information strategies from previous tables were not yielding positive 
alphas. Once refinements to control for outsourcing of information and bench­
marking, the risk-adjusted return of the hard information strategy (SPREAD) 
turns positive with important levels of statistical significance. The evidence in 
this table suggests that centralized organizations are better at collecting hard 
information than decentralized funds.
1.4.3 Fund-by-fund trading strategy
One of the objections to the trading strategies implemented above could be 
that they do not control for investment style. For instance, if decentralized 
funds tend to be growth funds and growth companies tend to be soft infor­
mation companies, then one could argue that the results above partially show
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that growth funds tend to be better at picking growth stocks. To address this 
concern, I implement a strategy based on holdings at the fund level. For de­
centralized and centralized funds (hierarchy score equal to one and five respec­
tively), I re-calculate a fund-specific information score by ranking the stocks 
in a funds portfolio by the aggregate information variable calculated in sec­
tion 1.3.1.1. I then group these stocks in four groups where the first and 
fourth groups have the stocks with the lowest and highest aggregate informa­
tion score respectively (I exclude stocks below the 20th NYSE size percentile). 
I form a trading strategy for each fund by going long a value-weighted port­
folio of companies in the fourth quartile of the fund-specific information score 
(’’hard information” stocks) and short-selling a a value-weighted portfolio of 
companies in the first quartile of the fund-specific information score (’’soft in­
formation” companies). Every month, I aggregate the trading strategies by 
averaging the returns for the universe of decentralized and centralized funds 
respectively. For every month, I calculate the difference between the average 
return of the centralized fund trading strategies and the average return of the 
decentralized fund trading strategies. I rebalance the fund-specific strategies 
at the end of each quarter. In other to rule out funds that only invest in hard 
or soft information companies (top and bottom deciles of the cross-sectional 
information score), I exclude funds that do not hold at least a%  of companies 
that are below the median of the cross-sectional information score.
This implementation controls for investment style since the trading strat­
egy is based on the holdings of individual funds as opposed to the holdings of 
all funds of a particular organizational structure (i.e. goes long growth stocks, 
short-sells growth stocks). Since the trading strategy buys portfolios of ’’hard” 
information companies and short-sells portfolios of ’’soft” information compa­
nies, it is sensible to expect that the trading strategy for centralized funds 
yields positive returns whereas the strategy for decentralized funds delivers 
negative returns. Therefore the difference between both strategies (centralized 
minus decentralized) should be, on average, positive. To test this conjecture, 
I regress this difference on several pricing and benchmarking factors. I include
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factors that track the excess returns of all soft information companies (INFOl) 
and hard information companies (INFO 10) . This ensures that the ALPHA of 
the difference is neutral with respect to the information scores. The results in 
Table 1.11 confirm my conjecture. Each panel in Table 1.11 presents the re­
sults for different levels of alpha. We can see that the difference between these 
strategies ranges from 0.18 % a month (2.18% year) to 0.37% a month (4.53% 
per year). This provides evidence that, at the fund level, centralized funds do 
much better on their ” harder” information positions while decentralized funds 
do better on the their ’’softer” information holdings.
1.4.4 Cross-sectional regressions
Hypothesis 3 conjectures that decentralized funds are able to forecast future 
returns of soft information companies. In other words, since these funds are 
able to collect and incorporate soft information in their asset allocation pro­
cess, their aggreagte actions should predict the average future returns of soft 
information companies. For instance, if the majority of decentralized funds 
overweights a particular soft information stock, it should be because the man­
agers of these funds obtained positive (soft information) signals about the 
future performance of the stock. Therefore, I argue tha t the average ’’in­
vestment intensity” of decentralized funds should forecast the returns of soft 
information companies. In other words, high average intensity of investment 
of decentralised funds should forecast high future expected returns for soft 
information stocks.
To explore whether ownership of soft and hard information stocks by cen­
tralized and decentralized funds predicts the cross-section of stock returns, 
Table 1.12 presents a series of pooled regressions of returns of stocks held by 
mutual funds (I exclude stocks below the 20th NYSE size percentile). The 
sample goes from April 1993 to March 2007. The dependent variable is stock 
returns measured from the end of month t to the end of month t+3. These 
returns are regressed on stock characteristics measured at the end of month 
t. The stock predictors I employ are book-to-market ratio (B/M), the to­
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tal individual stock return over the previous 12 months (RET12), the monthly 
trading volume scaled by the number of shares outstanding averaged across the 
previous three months (TURN), the standard deviation of monthly individual 
stock returns over the previous 12 months (VOL). I also include the aum- 
weighted intensity of investment for all hierarchy quintiles and dummies for all 
information deciles. Because some of the regressors do not have well-behaved 
distributions, I use their natural logarithm (INTENSITY, B/M , TURN). To 
control for time heterogeneity, I add time dummies and cluster standard errors 
by time across firms.
In the first column of Table 1.12 (Model 1), future returns are regressed 
on four predictors (B/M, RET12, TURN, and VOL). The results show the 
predictive power of these regressors and confirm previous findings in the lit­
erature. Model 2 adds dummies for all deciles of the information score. The 
average returns of stocks increases as their information score increases. For 
instance, we see that the average quarterly return of soft information compa­
nies (bottom decile of the information score distribution) is lower than that of 
hard information companies (top decile of information score). This is consis­
tent with the findings in Table 1.2. Model 3 shows how future average returns 
covary with the aum-weighted investment intensity from different quintiles of 
the hierarchy score. We observe that, on average, ownership by centralized 
organizations tends to be negatively correlated with future returns. Model 4 
shows a very similar picture when both, investment score dummies and aum- 
weighted investment intensities are added. Model 5 interacts the dummies 
for the lowest (SOFT) and highest (HARD) information score deciles with the 
aum-weighted investment intensities of decentralized (INTENSITY1) and cen­
tralized (INTENSITY5) funds. The interaction terms indicate the marginal 
effect of ownership by decentralized and centralized funds on the future return 
of soft and hard information companies. Of the four interaction terms, the only 
one that is economically and statistically significant is the one that measures 
the marginal effect of decentralized funds’ ownership on the average future 
return of soft information companies (INTENSITYl x SOFT). For example,
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a one standard deviation shock to INTENSITY!., leads to a marginal effect on 
the average future return of soft information stocks of 50 bps per quarter (2% 
per year). This provides evidence in favour of Hypothesis 3.
1.5 Conclusion
Loosely relying on Stein (2002), I test the effect of organizational structure on 
the collection and usage of information in a sample of actively managed US 
equity funds. I also develop scores that measure the information ’’softness” 
of stocks and the organizational complexity of mutual funds. I find that the 
level of organizational complexity of a fund positively covaries with its average 
information score of its holdings. I also document that there is a difference in 
ability to use soft information between decentralized and centralized funds. I 
show tha t centralized funds seem to also have an advantage in producing hard 
information, once one takes into account possible benchmarking needs and the 
outsourcing of information production. Furthermore, decentralized funds also 
seem able to pick soft information stocks with higher expected returns than 
their average.
The first set of results indicates that hierarchical funds tilt their portfolios 
towards hard information stocks. This confirms Stein’s insight in that, since 
the only information that can be transmitted is hard information, hierarchical 
funds rely more on it and therefore tilt their portfolios to hard-information 
stocks. This relationship between organization and information helps explain 
the increase in demand for large stocks (usually hard information companies) 
documented in Gompers and Metrick (2001) and the consequent reversal of 
the small stock risk premia over the last 30 years. The surge of institutional 
investors and the growth of the delegated asset management industry, has 
given rise to complex hierarchical (centralized) organizations as investment 
managers. The rise of these hierarchical investment managers may also help 
explain the replacement of soft information with hard information as the basis 
for financial transactions documented in Petersen (2004).
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One last important point is noteworthy. My results may help explain why 
concentrated funds tend to outperform diversified ones 10. As we have seen, 
decentralized funds tilt their portfolios towards soft information stocks. Since 
soft information is not transferable, collectors of this information have a longer 
first mover advantage relative to collectors of more transferable information 
(i.e. hard information). Therefore, it is optimal for collectors of soft infor­
mation companies to deviate from holding a diversified portfolio. Instead of 
holding a diversified portfolio, they choose to learn extensively about fewer 
stocks in hope of collecting informational rents in the future. From Table
1.3 we can see how the average portfolio weight is negatively correlated with 
the aum-weighted hierarchy score. Therefore, it is possible that the of con­
centrated funds outperform diversified ones due to the incorporation of large 
soft-information bets in their portfolios. The relationship between information 
production, hierarchical structure and portfolio concentration is therefore and 
interesting topic for future research in the field of delegated asset management.
10Kacperczyk Sialm and Zheng (2005) argue that concentrated managers outperform di­
versified ones and that the effect is more pronounced amongst managers that hold portfolios 
concentrated in few industries. Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2008) derive conditions 
under which deviating and holding a concentrated portfolio is an optimal strategy. Bask 
Busse and Green (2006) discuss mutual fund performance and managers’ willingness to take 
big bets in a relatively small number of stocks. They document that concentrated managers 
tend to outperform their diversified counterparts.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics: Information Variables
Panel A reports time-series averages of equal-weighted quarterly cross-sectional means and standard deviations of the information variables 
and the return predictors. Log B /M  is the natural logarithm of the book-to-market ratio; Log AGE is the natural logarithm of the number 
of months a stock has been reported in CRSP; NUM EST is the number of analyst one-year EPS estimates outstanding for a stock; RET12 
(momentum) is the total individual stock return over the previous 12 months; Log SZ is the log of market capitalization; TURN(turnover) 
is the monthly trading volume scaled by shares outstanding, averaged over the previous three months and divided by two for Nasdaq stocks; 
VOL (volatility) is the standard deviation of monthly individual stock returns over the previous 12 months; INFO is the information score. 
Panel B reports time-series averages of cross-sectional correlations. The sample period runs from the first quarter of 1993 to the last quarter 
of 2006. Only stocks held by mutual funds are included.
Log AGE Log BM Log SZ NUM EST OWN RET12 TURN VOL INFO
Panel A: Means standard deviations
Mean 4.58 0.47 19.43 6.48 0.41 0.39% 0.25 0.14 5.67
Standard Deviation 1.19 0.33 1.85 7.81 0.26 0.04 0.32 0.09 2.86
Observations per quarter (average) 4786 4448 4749 4786 4786 4395 4677 4395 4749
Panel B: Contemporaneous correlations
Log AGE 0.11 0.22 0.25 0.18 0.07 -0.09 -0.28 0.57
Log BM -0.37 -0.16 -0.15 -0.41 -0.19 -0.05 0.16
Log SZ 0.74 0.57 0.23 0.23 -0.31 0.25
NUM EST 0.47 -0.01 0.25 -0.17 0.55
OWN 0.12 0.26 -0.20 0.58




Table 1.2: Information Score Returns - Regressions
Dependent variable is the value-weigthed excess return of a portfolio made of all stocks with 
information score (INFO) equal to i at time t. Stocks below the NYSE 20th percentile 
are excluded. ALPHA is the risk-adjusted return of each portfolio. The three Fama-French 
factors are zero-investment portfolios representing the excess return of the market, MKTRF; 
the difference between a portfolio of “small” stocks and “big” stocks, SMB; and the difference 
between a portfolio of “high” book-to-market stocks and “low” book-to-market stocks, HML. 
The fourth factor, UMD, is the difference between a portfolio of stocks with high past one- 
year returns minus a portfolio of stocks with low past one-year returns. The fifth factor, 
LIQ, is the innovations in the aggregate level of liquidity in Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). 
The sixth factor, ST REV (Short-term Reversal), is the average return on the two low prior 
return portfolios minus the average return on the two high prior return portfolios, t-statistics 
are in parentheses.
ALPHA MKTRF SMB HML UMD LIQ ST REV R2





































































































































































Table 1.3: Summary Statistics: Hierarchy Variables
Panel A reports time-series averages of equal-weighted quarterly cross-sectional means and standard deviations of mutual fund 
variables. Log AUM is the natural logarithm of t e total assets under management; NUM MGRS is the total number of managers 
in charge of the fund; Log FAM SIZE is the log of the total assets under management of all actively managed US equity funds in a 
family; NUM FUNDS is the number of actively managed US equity sibling funds; Log FLOW is the log flow of new funds and is 
defined as the difference between log growth rate for the AUM and the log return; Past Log FLOW is the Log Flow in the previous 
quarter; W is the average portfolio weight. Panel B reports time-series averages of cross-sectional correlations; HIERARCHY is the 
hierarchy score; INFO is the information score. The sample period runs from the first quarter of 1993 to the last quarter of 2006. 
Only actively managed US equity mutual funds are included.
Log AGE W VWA INFO Log AUM Log FLOW Log FAM SIZE NUM FUNDS NUM MGRS HIERARCHY
Panel A: Means standard deviations
Mean 4.35 0.02 7.32 4.87 0.05 7.37 10.45 2.10 2.97
Standard Deviation 0.97 0.01 0.88 1.88 0.29 2.31 12.45 1.37 1.39
Observations per quarter (average) 986 986 986 975 962 874 876 922 985
Panel B: Contemporaneous correlations
Log AGE
oi-Hoo©1 0.56 -0.24 0.19 0.02 0.00 0.15
W 0.08 -0.32 0.00 -0.31 -0.14 -0.10 -0.28
VWA INFO 0.08 -0.06 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.06
Log AUM -0.07 0.59 0.21 0.06 0.45
Log FLOW 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00
Log FAM SIZE 0.67 0.04 0.76
NUM FUNDS -0.08 0.40
NUM MGRS 0.49
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Table 1.4: Hierarchy Score Returns - Regressions
Dependent variable is the quarterly excess return of a value-weigthed portoflio 
made of funds that belong to hierarchy schore (HIERARCHY) equal to i at 
time t.All other factores are explained in Table 1.2. t-statistics are in paren­
theses.
ALPHA MKTRF SMB HML UMD LIQ ST REV R2
HIERARCHY =  1 -0.27% 1.00 0.26 0.00 0.98
-(1.59) (41.80) (8.17) -(0.13)
-0.31% 1.02 0.28 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.05 0.99
-(1.58) (39.88) (8.92) (0.23) (1.04) -(0.63) -(1.73)
HIERARCHY =  2 -0.14% 0.98 0.16 -0.09 0.98
-(0.72) (37.37) (4.62) -(2.80)
-0.15% 1.00 0.19 -0.08 0.03 -0.01 -0.07 0.99
-(0.74) (38.40) (5.97) -(2.58) (1.15) -(0.65) -(2.75)
HIERARCHY =  3 -0.37% 0.98 0.08 -0.06 0.99
-(2.66) (50.86) (2.98) -(2.50)
-0.41% 0.97 0.07 -0.06 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.99
-(2.44) (44.02) (2.65) -(2.15) (0.46) (0.40) (0.50)
HIERARCHY =  4 0.13% 1.00 0.10 -0.13 0.98
(0.59) (33.65) (2.47) -(3.55)
0.00% 1.03 0.13 -0.11 0.05 0.01 -0.06 0.98
(0.01) (34.25) (3.42) -(3.13) (1.96) (0.36) -(1.98)
HIERARCHY =  5 0.26% 1.00 0.10 -0.04 0.97
(1.14) (31.58) (2.45) -(1.09)
0.10% 1.04 0.15 -0.02 0.06 -0.02 -0.06 0.98
(0.42) (32.63) (3.69) -(0.42) (2.02) -(1.10) -(1.69)
HI - H5 -0.53% 0.00 0.16 0.04 0.32
-(2.99) (0.01) (4.75) (1.26)
-0.41% -0.02 0.14 0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.37
-(1.95) -(0.79) (4.00) (0.69) -(1.37) (0.68) (0.35)
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Table 1.5: Determinants of Information Score
Dependent variable is the weighted average information score for each mutual 
fund portfolio in the sample at a quarter-end date. HIERARCHY i at time 
t - LAG  is a dummy that equals one if the fund belongs to hierarchy score i, 
and equals zero otherwise. Log AGE is the natural logarithm of the number of 
months a fund has been reported in CRSP plus one. LOG FLOW is a quarterly
(  T N A ' \measure of net flows defined as flow ij = log ( J — log (1 +  Ri,t)- PAST
FLOW is the FLOW of the past quarter. RETURN is a fund’s quarterly excess 
return. CONCENTRATION is the average portfolio weight of a fund. Robust 
t-statistics are in brackets. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level.
LAG = 0 LAG =  6 LAG =12
INTERCEPT 7.030*** 7.033*** 7.010***
[55.755] [55.575] [54.793]
HIERARCHY 2 0.098** 0.096** 0.096**
[2.361] [2.307] [2.245]
HIERARCHY 3 0.125*** 0.124*** 0.137***
[2.693] [2.652] [2.861]
HIERARCHY 4 0.160*** 0.168*** 0.177***
[3.303] [3.432] [3.539]
HIERARCHY 5 0.219*** 0.219*** 0.237***
[4.301] [4.284] [4.555]
AGE 0.126*** 0.127*** 0.127***
[6.730] [6.772] [6.726]
LOG FLOW -0.173*** -0.171*** -0.166***
[-5.549] [-5.519] [-5.281]
PAST LOG FLOW -0.118*** -0.114*** -0.114***
[-4.303] [-4.171] [-4.166]
RETURN -0.612*** -0.601*** -0.601***
[-9.089] [-8.978] [-8.961]
CONCENTRATION 10.004*** 10.028*** 10.147***
[4.898] [4.892] [4.906]
Investment Style Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year.Qtr Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 37733 37687 37597
R-squared 0.166 0.165 0.165
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Table 1.6: D e te rm in an ts  of In fo rm atio n  Score - N ew  F unds
Dependent variable is the weighted average information score for each U.S. 
actively managed mutual fund portfolio that IPOs in my sample 12 months 
after they are launched. LOG FUNDS and NUM MGRS are defined as in 
Table 1.3. The other variables are defined as in Table 1.5. Robust t-statistics 
are in brackets.





LOG AGE -0.128** -0.138**
[-1.965] [-2.188]
LOG FLOW 0.006 -0.009
[0.051] [-0.074]






INTERCEPT 7.285*** 7 415***
[21.504] [23.375]
Year Dummies Yes Yes




Table 1.7: Trading strategy: Value-Weighted M onthly Regressions
Dependent variable is the monthly return of a portfolio trade. These four portfolio trades are 
the soft and hard information stocks held by the centralised and decentralised mutual funds 
in my sample in every quarter-end date. These portfolio trades axe rebalanced every quarter. 
Panel A (B)shows regression coefficients for portfolios of soft (hard)information companies 
held by decentralized and centralized companies and their difference. These portfolios are 
value-weighted. The other variables (including SOFT (INFO =  1) and HARD (INFO =  
10)) are defined as in Table 1.2. Robust t-statistics are in brackets.
Panel A: Soft Info Stocks DECENTRALIZED CENTRALIZED SPREAD (DEC-CEN)
ALPHA 0.0036 0.0033 -0.0010 -0.0016 0.0047*** 0.0050*** 0.0049***
[1.15] [1.05] [-0.33] [-0.53] [2.80] [2.97] [2.96]
MKTRF 1.25*** 1.18*** 1.21*** 1.14*** 0.04 0.05 0.07
[15.42] [15.21] [15.33] [14.33] [1.00] [1.15] [0.75]
SMB Q 7^*** 0.69*** 0.73*** 0.71*** -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
[4.70] [4.59] [5.41] [5.32] [-0.34] [-0.35] [-0.06]
HML -0.78*** -0.82*** -0.73*** -0 77*** -0.05 -0.05 -0.06
[-5.97] [-6 .21] [-5.85] [-6.00] [-0.82] [-0.86] [-0.88]
UMD 0.33*** 0.35*** 0.26*** 0.30*** 0.06** 0.05* 0.06*
[3.82] [4.32] [3.47] [4.10] [2.19] [1.70] [1.79]
LIQ 0.13** 0.12** 0.00 0.00
[2.07] [2.39] [0.06] [0.11]
ST REV 0.03 0.08 -0.05* -0.05
[0.29] [0.80] [-1.70] [-1.65]
SOFT -0.02
[-0.22]
Observations 168 168 168 168 168 168 168
R-squared 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.04 0.05 0.05
Panel B: Hard Info Stocks DECENTRALIZED CENTRALIZED SPREAD (CEN-DEC)
ALPHA 0.0013 0.0016 0.0012 0.0014 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001
[1.09] [1.21] [0.97] [1.10] [-1.65] [-1.56] [-1.47]
MKTRF 1.04*** 1.05*** 1 04*** 1.05*** 0.00 0.00 0.01
[31.59] [28.16] [32.03] [28.45] [0.11] [0.02] [1.62]
SMB -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
[-1.42] [-1.41] [-1.19] [-1.18] [5.50] [5.34] [5.21]
HML 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
[4.38] [4.40] [4.70] [4.71] [4.33] [4.06] [4.43]
UMD -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.10*** -0 .11*** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
[-3.12] [-3.52] [-3.17] [-3.58] [-0.39] [-0.36] [-0.81]
LIQ -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00
[-0.40] [-0.38] [0.60] [0.55]
ST REV -0.04 -0.04 -0.00 -0.00
[-0.85] [-0.87] [-0.32] [-0.55]
HARD -0.01*
[-1.97]
Observations 168 168 168 168 168 168 168
R-squared 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.14 0.15 0.16
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Table 1.8: Trading strategy: Abnormal Portfolio Tilts M onthly Re­
gressions
Dependent variables are as in Table 1.7. However, the portfolio weights of each portfolio 
trade are calculated differently. For each fund in my sample, I calculate the investment tilt 
for each of its holdings. This tilt is defined as the fund’s portfolio weight on a holding divided 
by the average portfolio weight of the fund. Each quarter-end date, I identify four portfolio 
trades as in Table 1.7. I calculate the asset-weigthed average portfolio tilt of each stock in 
each one of these portfolio trades. For each portfolio trade, I normalize the asset-weigthed 
average portfolio tilts so they sum up to one. I use these normalized tilts as portfolio weights 
in each of the four portfolio trades. All variables other variables are defined as in Table 1.7. 
Robust t-statistics axe in brackets.
Panel A: Soft Info Stocks DECENTRALIZED CENTRALIZED SPREAD (DEC-CEN)
ALPHA 0.0024 0.0022 -0.0042 -0.0044* 0.0066*** 0.0067*** 0.0064***
[1.00] [0.91] [-1.65] [-1.70] [3.00] [2.97] [2.83]
MKTRF 1.23*** 1.20*** 1.31*** 1.25*** -0.09 -0.05 0.08
[19.77] [20.13] [20.38] [18.41] [-1.27] [-0.68] [0.64]
SMB 0.87*** 0.86*** 0.95*** 0.93*** -0.08 -0.07 0.03
[7.83] [7.75] [11.13] [11.73] [-1.01] [-0.83] [0.19]
HML -0.38*** -0.40*** -0.45*** -0.49*** 0.07 0.09 0.03
[-4.06] [-4.10] [-4.47] [-5.09] [0.73] [0.96] [0.29]
UMD 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.26*** 0.28*** -0.08 -0.09* -0.07
[3.08] [3.27] [4.67] [5.40] [-1.63] [-1.83] [-1.47]
LIQ 0.06 0.14*** -0.08* -0.07*
[1.28] [3.10] [-1.93] [-1.68]
ST REV 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.01
[0.19] [0.18] [-0.04] [0.11]
SOFT -0.12
[-1.15]
Observations 168 168 168 168 168 168 168
R-squared 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.09 0.12 0.13
Panel B: Hard Info Stocks DECENTRALIZED CENTRALIZED SPREAD (CEN-DEC)
ALPHA 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 0.0007 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004
[0.05] [0.21] [0.27] [0.57] [0.60] [0.98] [0.87]
MKTRF 1 14*** 1.15*** 1.13*** 1 44*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.05
[28.48] [27.46] [30.08] [30.53] [-0.88] [-0.67] [-1.11]
SMB 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.34*** 0.34*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
[7.28] [6.97] [6.74] [6.64] [-0.27] [-0.37] [-0.27]
HML 0.58*** 0.58*** 0.51*** 0.51*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.08***
[10.68] [10.39] [9.35] [8.93] [-3.90] [-4.00] [-4.04]
UMD -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.14*** 0.00 -0.00 0.00
[-3.57] [-3.67] [-3.39] [-3.67] [0.25] [-0.20] [0.24]
LIQ -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01
[-0.48] [-0.28] [0.86] [0.89]
ST REV -0.03 -0.06 -0.03 -0.03
[-0.63] [-1.19] [-1.64] [-1.60]
HARD 0.04
[1.08]
Observations 168 168 168 168 168 168 168
R-squared 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.15 0.20 0.21
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Table 1.9: Trading strategy: Overlapping holdings Regressions
Dependent variables are as in Table 1.7. Portfolio holdings of each portfolio trade are as in 
Table 1.7. However, I exclude non-overlapping stocks in each Panel. Portfolio weights are 
based on intensity of investment as in Table 1.8. All variables other variables are defined as 
in Table 1.7. Robust t-statistics are in brackets.
Panel A: Soft Info Stocks DECENTRALIZED CENTRALIZED SPREAD (DEC-CEN)
ALPHA 0.0015 0.0015 -0.0057* -0.0057* 0.0072** 0.0072** 0.0065**
[0.58] [0.55] [-1.86] [-1.81] [2.34] [2.26] [2.08]
MKTRF 1.26*** 2 24*** 1 34*** j 27*** -0.08 -0.03 0.26
[18.72] [19.06] [18.73] [16.91] [-1.05] [-0.34] [1.48]
SMB 0.87*** 0.86*** 0.97*** 0.95*** -0.10 -0.09 0.12
[7.84] [7.77] [11.01] [11.84] [-1.04] [-0.83] [0.59]
HML -0.28*** -0.29*** -0.37*** -0.43*** 0.10 0.14 -0.01
[-2.74] [-2.81] [-3.19] [-3.88] [0.83] [1.11] [-0.10]
UMD 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.28*** 0.31*** -0.09 -0.11* -0.06



















Observations 168 168 168 168 168 168 168
R-squared 0.86 0.86 0.84 0.85 0.07 0.11 0.14
Panel B: Hard Info Stocks DECENTRALIZED CENTRALIZED SPREAD (CEN-DEC)
ALPHA 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 0.0008 0.0002 0.0004 0.0004
[0.07] [0.25] [0.26] [0.58] [0.52] [0.90] [0.78]
MKTRF 1 24* * * 1.15*** 1.12*** 2 24*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.06
[28.61] [27.52] [30.34] [30.70] [-1.02] [-0.73] [-1.17]
SMB 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.34*** 0.34*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
[7.21] [6.90] [6.64] [6.55] [-0.34] [-0.43] [-0.33]
HML 0.58*** 0.58*** 0.50*** 0.50*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.09***
[10.70] [10.42] [9.26] [8.85] [-4.12] [-4.20] [-4.26]
UMD -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.13*** 0.01 0.00 0.01



















Observations 168 168 168 168 168 168 168
R-squared 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.16 0.21 0.22
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Table 1.10: Trading strategy: Hard Information Companies
Dependent variables are as in Table 1.7. Panel A calculates the residual number of analyst 
estimates median of each portfolio trade. I remove holdings with residual number of analyst 
estimates above their median. Portfolio weights are based on intensity of investment of each 
holding in each portfolio trade as in Table 1.8. Panel eliminates S&P 500 constituents from 
hard information portfolios trades from Table 1.8. Portfolio weights are based on intensity 
of investment as in Table 1.8. Dependent variables are as in Table 1.7. All variables other 
variables are defined as in Table 1.7. Robust t-statistics are in brackets.
Panel A: Number of Estimates DECENTRALIZED CENTRALIZED SPREAD (CEN-DEC)
ALPHA -0.0009 -0.0006 0.0001 0.0006 0 .0010* 0 .0012* 0.0011*
[-0.67] [-0.45] [0.06] [0.43] [1.73] [1.94] [1.89]
MKTRF 1.12*** 0.39*** 1.08*** -0.04** -0.03** -0.09
[31.68] [31.36] [8.12] [31.69] [-2.23] [-2.09] [-1.57]
SMB 0.39*** 0.38*** 0.57*** 0.38*** 0.00 -0.00 0.00
[9.26] [9.12] [11.30] [8.44] [0.04] [-0.03] [0.07]
HML 0.67*** 0.67*** -0.07 0.56*** -0 .10*** -0.10*** -0.12***
[14.03] [13.28] [-1.65] [10.53] [-4.56] [-4.64] [-4.75]
UMD -0.06 -0.07** -0.08** -0.01 -0.01 -0.01



















Observations 168 168 168 168 168 168 168
R-squared 0.88 0.88 0.87 0.88 0.16 0.19 0.20
Panel B: No S&P 500 Constituents DECENTRALIZED CENTRALIZED SPREAD (CEN-DEC)
ALPHA -0.0007 -0.0005 0.0000 0.0006 0.0008 0.0010 0.0010
[-0.51] [-0.33] [0.03] [0.43] [1.05] [1.37] [1.33]
MKTRF 1.13*** 1.15*** 1 12*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.05
[26.80] [25.59] [29.45] [29.94] [-0.73] [-0.51] [-0.63]
SMB 0.33*** 0.34*** 0.32*** 0.32*** -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
[6.33] [6.06] [5.81] [5.83] [-0.56] [-0.66] [-0.60]
HML 0.61*** 0.62*** 0.49*** 0.49*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.14***
[11.00] [10.92] [8.74] [8.35] [-4.45] [-4.37] [-4.15]
UMD -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07* -0.02 -0.03 -0.02



















Observations 168 168 168 168 168 168 168
R-squared 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.17 0.20 0.20
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Table 1.11: Fund-by-fund Self-financing trading strategy
Each quarter I identify funds that belong to the top and bottom quintile of the 
hierarchy score (centralized and decentralized funds) that hold at least a %  of their 
assets in stocks that are below the information score median. For each fund, the 
information score is recalculated using the fund’s holdings only. The self financing 
trading strategy is constructed by going long hard information companies (informa­
tion score =  10) and short soft information companies (information score =  1) for 
each fund at the end of each quarter. I aggregate the return for the decentralized and 
centralized fund strategies respectively. The dependent variable in the regressions is 
the difference between the average return for the centralized fund trading strategies 
and the the average return for the centralized fund trading strategies. The strategies 
are held for a quarter and rebalanced at the end of each quarter. The other variables 
are defined as in Table 1.2. t-statistics are in parentheses.
ALPHA MKTRF SMB HML UMD LIQ ST REV INFOl INF09 R2
Panel A: a  =  5% 0.18% 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.01
(2.12) (0.93) -(0.31) -(0.16)
0.18% 0.05 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 0.04 0.08
(2.06) (0.58) (0.53) -(0.58) (1.00) -(1.67) -(2.09) -(1.06) (0.60)
Panel B: a  =  10% 0.23% 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.01
(2.56) (1.01) -(0.67) -(0.26)
0.22% 0.05 0.02 -0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 0.06 0.11
(2.45) (0.56) (0.63) -(1.02) (1.32) -(1.61) -(2.20) -(1.55) (0.95)
Panel C: a  =  15% 0.22% 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.02
(2.15) (1.27) -(0.51) -(0.25)
0.20% 0.12 0.03 -0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 0.02 0.10
(2.00) (1.19) (0.81) -(0.83) (1.26) -(1.57) -(1.81) -(1.71) (0.27)
Panel D: a  =  20% 0.27% 0.05 -0.04 0.03 0.03
(2.27) (1.49) -(1.23) (0.65)
0.24% 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.07 0.04 0.11
(2.01) (1.14) (0.27) -(0.01) (1.48) -(1.98) -(1.26) -(1.65) (0.42)
Panel E: a  =  25% 0.35% 0.06 -0.06 0.00 0.03
(2.43) (1.44) -(1.56) (0.05)
0.29% 0.18 0.00 -0.03 0.07 -0.04 -0.05 -0.09 0.03 0.13
(2.06) (1.30) -(0.06) -(0.44) (2.14) -(1.95) -(1.30) -(1.68) (0.29)
Panel F: a  =  30% 0.44% 0.05 -0.07 -0.05 0.03
(2.71) (1.06) -(1.42) -(0.82)
0.37% 0.06 -0.06 -0.06 0.09 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 0.08 0.11
(2.23) (0.38) -(0.87) -(0.81) (2.51) -(1.51) -(1.16) -(0.51) (0.68)
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Table 1.12: Cross-sectional Regressions
The Dependent variable is the stock return from month t to month t+ 3 . B /M  (book- 
to-market ratio), TURN (turnover), RET12 (momentum), and VOL (volatility) are 
defined as in Table 1.1. SOFT is a dummy that equals one if stock has the lowest 
information score and zero otherwise. HARD is a dummy that equals one if the 
stock has the highest information score. INTENSITY i is the aggregate investment 
intensity of funds belonging to quintile i of the hierarchy score on a stock. Aggregate 
investment intensity is defined as in Table 7. t-statistics are in brackets and errors 
are clustered by time across firms.
MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 MODEL5
B/M 0.00874* 0.00817* 0.00841* 0.00724* 0.00719
[1.861] [1.755] [1.868] [1.674] [1.655]
TURN -0.00659 -0.00973* -0.00612 -0.00867* -0.00873*
[-1.406] [-1.932] [-1.302] [-1.724] [-1.736]
RET12 0.09969 0.10426* 0.09864 0.10660* 0.10646*
[1.632] [1.716] [1.577] [1.705] [1.702]
VOL -0.08939** -0.08380** -0.09012** -0.08619** -0.08628**
[-2.244] [-2.140] [-2.249] [-2.178] [-2.180]
INTENSITY1 0.00119 0.00067 0.00032
[0.745] [0.431] [0.205]
INTENSITY2 0.00180 0.00126 0.00127
[1.174] [0.850] [0.859]
INTENSITY3 0.00045 -0.00001 -0.00001
[0.365] [-0.010] [-0.009]
INTENSITY4 -0.00128 -0.00185 -0.00183
[-0.762] [-1.055] [-1.042]
INTENSITY5 -0.00260* -0.00327** -0.00351**
[-1.869] [-2.413] [-2.584]
SOFT 0.00223 -0.01316*** -0.01495***
[0.484] [-2.998] [-3.028]
HARD 0.00850* -0.00580 -0.00646
[1.917] [-1.373] [-1.597]
INTENSITY1 X SOFT 0.00787*
[1.823]
INTENSITY1 X HARD 0.00025
[0.112]
INTENSITY5 X SOFT 0.00113
[0.223]
INTENSITY5 X HARD 0.00160
[0.962]
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Info Score Dummies No Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 170374 170374 170374 170374 170374
R-squared 0.166 0.166 0.166 0.167 0.167
Chapter 2 
M utual Fund Incubation: 
Innovation or M arketing Tool?
2.1 Introduction
Fund incubation (the creation and management of a mutual fund before it is 
offered to the public) is a very controversial topic in the money management 
industry. Those opposed to this practice argue that funds could be incubated 
with the sole purpose of generating outstanding track records for marketing 
purposes1. This claim seems to be supported by the high returns of incubated 
funds during their incubation period and their subsequent decline. On the 
other hand, it has been argued that fund incubation helps test relatively un­
known investment strategies and fund managers. The challenges posed by fund 
incubation have been recognized by regulators, practitioners, and academics. 
My main objective is to study how the relaxation of certain financial con­
straints during the incubation period (i.e. capital redemptions) affects funds’ 
investment strategies before and after their IPO ’s. Furthermore, I investigate 
whether mutual fund families are strategic when launching incubated funds 
and whether incubated funds attract a larger share of the new-fund capital
flows than non-incubated funds.
1Sirri and Tufano (1998), Chevalier and Ellison (1997) document a convex relationship 
between past performance and current capital flows.
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Mutual fund incubation is a tool that fund families employ to develop new 
fund offerings. Fund families start incubated funds with limited amounts of 
internally-raised capital. Fund families then have the option to offer these to 
the public or to terminate them at a later date2. If they choose to have an 
IPO for a mutual fund, the family can use the fund’s past performance for 
marketing purposes. In the U.S., this practice is governed by a series of No- 
Action letters issued by the S.E.C. (See Evans (2007) for more details). The 
issue with fund incubation is that, if investors use past performance as a proxy 
for managerial skill, fund families may choose to launch their incubated funds 
when their past returns are unusually high. This will some lead investors to 
wrongly conclude that the funds being offered have above-average investment 
skills. However, the open empirical questions is whether mutual fund investors 
indeed chase pre-IPO performance of new fund offerings or whether there are 
other more important fund flow determinants for new funds. Additionally, it 
remains unclear whether the incubation period has a long lasting effect in the 
investment strategies followed by incubated funds or whether these funds are 
no different than other new fund offerings.
In this paper, I document that families are strategic when choosing IPO 
dates for their incubated funds. Incubated funds are offered to the public 
when their 12-month return is above the median return of the mutual fund 
industry. The 12-month return of incubated funds tends to stay above the 
industry median for about 15 months and reverts back to the industry mean 
after that. This is consistent with an opportunistic behaivor that tries to 
exploit the positive relationship between past performance and capital flows.
One of the findings in the literature is that the performance of incubated 
funds decreases after their IPO, reinforcing the idea that incubation is used 
as a marketing tool. However, the decrease in post-IPO performance of in­
cubated funds is also consistent with the imposition of financial constraints
2Evans (2006) shows that incubated funds with high returns are more likely to be offered 
to the public whereas incubated funds with low returns are more likely to be liquidated. 
Evans(2007) documents that the inclusion of incubation returns in the CRSP Mutual Fund 
Database biases many of the results in the mutual fund literature, since these returns are 
unusually high.
57
associated with capital redemption rights. While during the incubation pe­
riod funds have the commitment of seed funds from their sponsors, after their 
IPO ’s funds allow investors to withdraw their shares at the funds’ current Net 
Asset Value (NAV) at any point in time. This feature imposes constraints 
on the type of investment strategies that can be implemented. For example, 
fund managers would be wary of high-return investments that required time 
to ’’mature” but that were very volatile in the interim. The reason is that 
investors may be unable to distinguish between bad interim returns of a high- 
return long-term investment strategy and bad performance due to managerial 
ability. This will induce some investors to redeem their capital forcing the fund 
manager to fire-sell assets in order to meet redemptions. These fire-sales would 
worsen the fund’s performance, increase fund’s redemptions and so on. This is 
exacerbated by the payoff complementarities amongst mutual fund investors 
(Chen Goldstein and Jiang (2007)). Prior studies provide evidence showing 
that investors who redeem their shares from a fund have a negative externality 
on investors who do not (see Eden(1999), Johnson (2004)). As a result, the 
expectation of future outflows increases the incentives of current investors to 
redeem their shares. Therefore, the insulation from outside investors’ capital 
and the commitment of family funds in the incubation period eliminates the 
payoff complementarities and relaxes financial constraints. This allows funds 
to explore different ’’corners” of the market and to implement high-return in­
vestment strategies that may need time to materialize.
Consistent with these conjectures, I find that incubated funds hold more 
illiquid stocks with a lower degree of institutional ownership during their in­
cubation period. I also find that the risk-adjusted returns of incubated finds 
decline after their IPO ’s. Furthermore, the characteristic-adjusted returns 3 
of a strategy that buys and holds the portfolio disclosures of incubated funds, 
yields 0.39% per month more during the incubation period. However, when 
I analyze funds’ trades of funds, which are active portfolio management deci­
3The characteristic adjusted returns axe calcualted as in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, 
and Wermers (1997) and Wermers (2004). The DGTW benchmarks are available via 
http: / / www.smith.umd.edu/faculty/rwermers/ftpsite/Dgtw/coverpage.htm
58
sions and hence a better indication of managerial ability, I find that incubated 
funds are better at buying stocks in the incubation period and better at selling 
stocks after their IPO ’s. For instance, the difference in characteristic-adjusted 
returns between buy-and-hold strategies based on the purchases of incubated 
funds before and after the IPO is on average 62 bps (0.62%) per month. Addi­
tionally, the difference in characteristic-adjusted returns between buy-and-hold 
strategies that purchase stock disposals of incubated funds before and after the 
IPO is 54 bps per month (0.54%). This evidence shows that, while incubated 
fund managers are better at buying stocks during the incubation period, they 
are better at selling stocks after the IPO.
Despite the change in investment strategies of incubated funds before and 
after the IPO, I find that incubated funds follow strategies that are different 
from those of other new fund offerings. I document that, after their IPO ’s, 
incubated funds tend to hold more illiquid and concentrated portfolios than 
non-incubated funds. Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2008) show that it 
is optimal for investors that first collect information systematically on a set 
of assets to hold concentrated portfolios. Therefore the difference in portfolio 
concentration between incubated and non-incubated funds can be attributed 
to the time spent learning about a set of stocks during the incubation period. 
I also show that incubated funds tend to hold stocks with lower institutional 
ownership. Since institutional investors (i.e. mutual funds) tend to invest in 
a very narrow set of stocks (Gompers and Metrick (2001)), fund incubation 
could be a way for fund families to test new investment strategies in lesser 
known securities. This evidence suggests that the incubation period helps 
funds explore a particular set of stocks. This ’’learning” process would not 
be feasible once the funds . Incubated funds can therefore be an important 
source of investment vehicles that span a different set of asset payoffs and that 
provide real diversification benefits to mutual fund investors. Moreover, I find 
that, while post-IPO risk-adjusted returns of incubated and non-incubated 
funds are very similar, incubated funds seem to be better at buying stock 
that non-incubated stocks. The difference in characteristic-adjusted returns
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between buy-and-hold strategies based on the post-IPO purchases of incubated 
funds and non-incubated funds respectively is 31 bps (0.31%) per month. This 
difference in managerial skill may be due to the fact that incubated funds can 
use their incubation period as a learning phase about a particular corner of 
the market and benefit from it long after their IPO ’s.
Furthermore, I study whether the high past returns of incubated mutual 
funds help them attract a larger share of fund flows than that of non-incubated 
funds. I document that, in the first 24 months after the IPO, the difference 
in relative fund flows between incubated and non-incubated funds is around 
-1%, after controlling for past (post-IPO) performance and other factors. This 
difference is mainly driven by the first post-IPO year of the new funds in my 
sample, where the difference is -2.5 %. These results illustrate that investors 
seem not be drawn to new funds offerings due to their pre-IPO track record.
The practice of fund incubation and the issues associated with it have been 
recognized in the academic literature. Most of the literature focuses on the 
biases induced by fund incubation. Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2001) suggest 
that track records of successful mutual funds may be backfilled with pre-IPO 
performance. The same issue is recognized in hedge fund databases by Park 
(1995) and Fung and Hsieh (2002). Elton, Gruber, and Rentzler (1989) suggest 
that the post-IPO underperformance of commodity funds could be due to the 
control that managers have over the reporting of pre-IPO performance. Evans 
(2007), quantifies the magnitude of the incubation bias in the CRSP Survivor- 
Bias Free U.S. Mutual Fund Database and proposes a methodology to account 
for it. Arteaga, Ciccotello, and Grant (1998) and Wisen (2002) examine the 
bias in returns for new fund offerings and its implications. Ackermann and 
Loughran (2007) examine the practice of mutual fund incubation in the U.S., 
the role of the S.E.C. and its potential unintended consequences4.
Constraints imposed by redemption rights of investment vehicles and co­
ordination problems amongst fund investors have also been studied in the
4For a legal treatment of fund incubation in the US see Ackermann and Loughran (2007), 
and Palmiter and Taha (2009), Franco (2009).
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literature. The initial public offering of a fund allows us to precisely identify 
periods where funds operate with and without financial constraints and coor­
dination problems amongst fund investors. This, in turn, helps us accurately 
determine the effects that these constrains have on the way funds operate. 
This relates to the literature on limits of arbitrage. In particular, it has been 
shown that limiting fund investors’ redemption rights can have positive effect 
on fund returns and may affect the portfolio characteristics of funds. Stein 
(2005) illustrates how open-end investment vehicles may have serious impedi­
ments to exploit arbitrage opportunities. Edelen (1999) shows that the liquid­
ity constraints imposed by redemptions rights in mutual funds can be quite 
substantial. Choria (1996) shows that the adverse effects of investor flows 
are more pronounced in funds holding more illiquid assets. Ippolito (1989) 
illustrates how the market-adjusted returns of load-type funds are higher than 
those of no-load funds. Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1998) show 
a positive relation between hedge fund returns an lockup provisions. Aragon 
(2007) shows that there is a negative relation between the liquidity of hedge 
fund portfolios and their lockup periods. This paper also relates to another 
strand of the literature that has focused on the negative externalities that fund 
investors redeeming their capital have on the other fund’s investors. Johnson 
(2004) shows that the liquidity costs imposed by short-term mutual fund in­
vestors are larger than that of long-term investors. Chen Goldstein and Jian 
(2007) present a model in which the payoff complementarities of investors in 
a mutual fund can cause investment fragility and provide evidence that con­
ditional on low past performance, redemptions are higher for funds for which 
payoff complementarities are stronger.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2 describes the data , section
2.3 presents the results and section 2.4 concludes.
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2.2 Data
I obtain mutual fund data from the CRSP Survivor-Bias Free U.S. Mutual 
Fund Database. To ensure that the sample consists of actively managed U.S. 
equity funds, I exclude index funds and funds that on average do not hold at 
least 85% of CRSP common stocks. The percentage of funds invested in NYSE- 
AMEX-NASDAQ CRSP common stock is calculated using portfolio holdings 
obtained from the Thompson Financial Mutual Fund Database. I merge the 
holdings data and the mutual fund data using the MFLINK tables provided 
by WRDS. This filters out some non-US actively managed equity funds. Ad­
ditionally, I screen out index funds by looking for the words associated with 
index funds and their abbreviations in the CRSP fund name variable. I also 
check that the MFLINK matches between the unique identifiers in the CRSP 
Mutual Fund Dataset and the unique identifiers in the Thomson Financial 
Mutual Fund Holdings database correspond to funds managed by the same 
management company. This eliminates erroneous MFLINK matches. As an 
additional check on the accuracy of the MFLINK matches, I eliminate funds 
for which the TNA reported in the TFN database is not between 1/1.3 and
1.3 of the TNA reported in the CRSP database.
To identify when a fund is officially offered to the public, I use NASD ticker 
creation dates. The creation date comes from annual snapshots of currently 
active tickers taken each January from 1999 to 2007. I match the CRSP 
Survivor-Bias Free US Mutual Fund and the NASD dataset5 by matching 
their NASDAQ tickers, fund names and dates. If a mutual fund share class 
were terminated before 1999 or if a mutual fund share class were started and 
terminated between the January snapshots, the mutual fund share class would 
not be included in the NASD data. Following Evans (2007), I keep only those 
funds that have a CRSP start date that is greater than or equal to January 
1 of 1996 6. The tickers are assigned to share classes of mutual funds (not 
to funds). I calculate the inception date of a mutual fund share class as the
5I thank Richard Evans for providing these data.
6 This allows funds at the beginning of my sample to be incubated for at least 3 years.
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minimum date between the first monthly return reported in the dataset and 
the ’’first offered date” variable from the CRSP dataset. I identify the share 
classes associated with each fund and calculate the inception date of the fund 
as the minimum inception date of its share classes’ inception dates. Similarly, 
the IPO of a fund is the earliest IPO date of its share classes’ IPO ’s.
Return and stock information data are from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) Monthly Stocks File for NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ 
stocks. I eliminate closed-end funds, real estate investment trusts (REIT), 
American Depository Receipts (ADR), foreign companies, primes, and scores. 
To correct returns for delisting bias, I use the adjustment proposed in Shumway 
(1997) and Shumway and Warther (1999) for NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ re­
spectively. I calculate the share of institutional ownership by summing the 
stock holdings of all reporting institutions for each stock in each quarter. 
Stocks that are in CRSP, but without any reported institutional holdings, 
are assumed to have zero institutional ownership. Ownership greater than 
one are omitted as they could be a result of double-reporting by institutional 
investors.
I follow Evans (2007) to assess whether a fund is incubated or not. A fund 
is considered to be incubated if the difference between the IPO date and the 
fund’s inception date is more than 12 calendar months. Funds that do not 
meet this criterion are considered to be non-incubated.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
My sample comprises 214 incubated funds and 591 non-incubated funds. Table
2.1 describes some summary statistics for the sample. The average period 
of incubation for incubated funds is 25 months. Non-incubated funds tend 
to be created 3 months before they are launched. The initial assets under 
management are very different for incubated and non incubated funds on the 
IPO date. Incubated funds tend to be smaller than non-incubated funds. The
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average TNA of incubated and non-incubated funds is 14.69 and 47.84 million 
dollars respectively. It is important to note that the difference in the average 
of the two type of funds is driven by some very large non-incubated funds (The 
difference in median TNA for both groups is only around 6 million dollars). 
Table 2.2 breaks down the investment objectives of new fund offerings for the 
sample period. The table shows a slight tendency for sector/specialized funds 
to be non-incubated. On the other hand, funds in more traditional investment 
objectives, like Growth and Income and Mid-Cap funds tend to be incubated. 
For instance, we can see that of all the new fund offerings that were incubated 
only 2.3% were Science and Technology funds compared to 8.0% of all the new 
offerings that were not incubated.
2.3.2 Fund Incubation and Fund Fam ilies’ Incentives
It has been previously argued that the high returns of incubated funds in the 
incubation period are due to self-selection. For instance, suppose that a family 
of funds starts 10 funds, randomly buys stocks for each fund and holds the 
mutual fund portfolios for 3 years. At the end of the period, the family can 
decide to launch the funds with best performance histories (i.e. funds that beat 
their benchmarks) and hope to benefit from the convex relationship between 
past performance and fund flows 7. In the following subsections, I document 
the extent of the difference between incubated fund returns before and after 
their IPO. I also study whether families are strategic when choosing IPO dates 
for their incubated funds.
2.3.2.1 Risk Adjusted Returns
Table 2.3 shows the extent to which the four factor risk adjusted alpha can be 
biased due to the backfilling of incubated fund returns in the CRSP Survivor-
7This practice is not as easy to implement as it seems. Firstly, under SEC rules, incubated 
funds belonging to the same family need to have distinct investment objectives. For instance, 
a family can not incubate 10 growth funds and pick the best one to be launched. Secondly, 
the S.E.C. rules indicate that any previous return history can be used for marketing purposes 
so long as it is not misleading for investors. In other words, the regulatory framework 
provides penalties for instances in which incubation is used is a misleading way.
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Bias Free U.S. Mutual Fund Database. Similar to Evans (2007), I find that 
the apparent outperformance of incubated funds disappears once the backfilled 
return histories are removed. Panel A and B show the factor loadings and 4- 
factor alphas for incubated and non-incubated funds. I estimate these factors 
with 36 months of return data for each new fund. I then calculate the average 
factor loadings and alphas for incubated and non-incubated funds respectively. 
Panel A uses data since the inception of each fund (i.e with backfilled returns). 
This panel shows that, on average, incubated funds outperform non-incubated 
funds by 0.22% per month or 2.7% per year in risk-adjusted terms. It is also im­
portant to note that according to this panel, incubated funds tend to load less 
on the market factor and more on the HML factors than non-incubated funds. 
They also seem to implement less momentum strategies (higher UMD factor 
loading) than non-incubated funds at the 10% level of statistical confidence. 
Incubated funds also carry more idiosyncratic risk as the R 2 of their regres­
sions is on average less than that of non-incubated funds. Panel B portrays a 
different picture. Panel B uses return history that has not been backfilled (i.e. 
return data after the mutual fund IPO). In this case, the outperformance of 
incubated funds is greatly reduced (9 bps per month at the 10% level). The 
difference in the market and HML loadings persists, although the statistical 
significance declines. There is no clear difference in the momentum factor load­
ing and the level of idiosyncratic risk is very similar. This results are in line 
with what has been previous documented in the literature. The results also 
hint at some important characteristics of the incubation period. In this period, 
incubated funds seem to load less on well-known sources of risk and seem to 
implement strategies that have higher idiosyncratic risk. This suggests that 
risk-return profiles of incubated funds before and after their IPO are different.
2.3.2.2 IPO Date Selection for Incubated Funds
Figure 2.1 plots the average 12-month return decile of incubated funds. As we 
can see in Figure 2.1, the 12-month return of incubated funds is the highest 
at around the IPO date. We can see that the average 12-month return decile
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of incubated funds, peaks three months prior to the IPO. The return decile 
then remains somewhat constant for about 18 months and declines gradually 
after that. This illustrates that incubated funds are on average launched when 
their returns are above the median return of mutual funds. To formally test 
this conjecture, each month I group all public mutual funds according to their 
12-month return decile. I then I regress their return deciles at the end of 
each month for all incubated funds in my sample on the number of months 
between the observation date and the IPO date (N). I further split N between 
negative and positive values. I use net returns as opposed to risk-adjusted 
returns as most of the evidence shows that the convex relationship between 
past performance and flows is based on non-risk-adjusted returns (See Del 
Guercio and Tkac (2002) and Del Guercio and Tkac (2007)) . Therefore, if 
families pursue funds by offering high past performance, they will focus on past 
returns in the incubation period. The regression is run for observations that 
are within 24 months of their fund’s IPO date. The results (Table 2.4) confirm 
the conclusions drawn from Figure 2.1. As funds approach their IPO dates, 
their 12-month return decile increases (Pi positive). After the IPO, the fund’s 
12-month return decile declines steadily (P2 negative). I further control for 
the 12-month average assets under management (log of TNA), relative flows8, 
investment style and style flows for every fund at time t. Adding this controls 
do not affect the main results. This evidence shows that families take their 
incubated funds public in an opportunistic fashion.
2.3.3 Investm ent Strategies and Fund Incubation
So far, we have seen that returns of incubated funds are unusually high before 
they are offered to the public. We have also seen that this may be premeditated 
as families try  to exploit the positive relationship between past returns and 
capital flows by launching their incubated funds when their returns are high. 
This seems to corroborate concerns regarding fund incubation. If investors use
8Relative Flows are defined as f low^t =  log ( 7^ 37^ )  _  log (1 +  Ri,t)
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past performance as a proxy for managerial ability, investors in new fund of­
ferings may wrongly infer that incubated funds have higher managerial ability 
that other comparable new funds. Indeed, Table 2.3 shows that, once funds 
have been launched, investors in incubated funds are only marginally better 
off than investors in non-incubated funds (9 bps per month or 1.08% per year 
at the 10% level of statistical confidence) as far as risk-adjusted returns are 
concerned. However, it is important to determine if investors are indeed at­
tracted to incubated funds due to their pre-IPO performance. If this is so, 
fund incubation may be misleading for investors. Secondly, the drop in pre 
and post IPO returns of incubated funds could be due to costly constraints 
and coordination problems. During the incubation period, funds are shielded 
from investors capital. When allows them to take longer-term investments 
and to avoid coordination problems amongst investors. My data on fund IPO 
dates allows me to accurately determine when these constraints arise. This, 
in turn, helps us precisely estimate the effect of these financial constraints on 
the investment strategies followed by funds.
2.3.3.1 Portfolio Characteristics
Incubated Funds: Pre and Post IPO
The difference in returns of incubated funds before and after their IPO’s 
could be due to financial constraints. As explained before, the threat of capi­
tal redemptions due to bad performance will induce manager to, ex-ante, take 
precautionary measures. To that extent, I study pre and post IPO incubated 
funds investment strategies by comparing their portfolio holdings in the two 
years preceding and in the 24 months after their IPO ’s. The first character­
istic I study is the overall liquidity of the funds’ portfolios. The results are 
presented in Table 2.5. In this test, I calculate the value-weighted average of 
the turnover of stocks held by mutual funds as a proxy for liquidity. Stock 
turnover is the average monthly turnover (trading volume /  shares outstand­
ing) in the last 3 months. Because Nasdaq is a dealer market with double 
counting of dealer buys and sells, the turnover of stocks traded on Nasdaq and
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NYSE/Amex is not directly comparable (see, e.g., Atkins and Dyl (1997)). I 
follow Nagel (2005) and divide the turnover of Nasdaq stocks by two. I re­
gresses this variable on INCUBATED, which is a dummy that equals one if 
the fund is incubated and zero otherwise and on PRE-IPO which is a dummy 
that equals one if the observation is before the IPO and zero otherwise. Atfer 
the IPO, incubated mutual funds hold securities that have less turnover than 
non-incubated funds. The difference in their value-weighted average turnover 
is -0.0142%. After controlling for the size of the fund (natural logarithm of as­
sets under management), the average relative fund flows between the previous 
and the current disclosure date, the average relative fund flows to the invest­
ment style between the previous and the current disclosure date and the fund’s 
investment style, this difference is equal to -0.0132 (10% of the sample aver­
age). This indicates that incubated funds hold more illiquid stocks during the 
incubation period which allows them to earn the liquidity premia associated 
with them. This is only possible thanks to the insulation from capital redemp­
tions as interim bad performance related to liquidity provision will not lead 
to capital withdrawals. It is also interesting to note that the value-weighted 
average turnover of a fund positively covaries with its size, past flows and past 
investment style flows. As flows and size increase, funds opt to invest in more 
liquid assets. This is an indication that as funds grow, liquidity management 
becomes more important.
Next, I analyze the level of portfolio concentration of incubated funds be­
fore and after the IPO. To measure portfolio concentration I use the Herfindahl 
Index.9 I find that there is no significant difference between the level of concen­
tration between the pre and post IPO period of incubated funds. This points 
out that incubated funds do not change their level of focus after their IPO. 
Therefore, any difference in returns in both stages is not due to a change in 
portfolio concentration.
Another important portfolio characteristic is the value-weighted average of
9 her f in d a h l i j  =  YhjeK wj,t where K  is the set of stocks held by mutual fund i at time 
t and w is the portfolio weight of j.
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institutional ownership of stocks held by a mutual fund. It is widely docu­
mented that a large part of the stocks in the US is not held by institutional 
investors. It has also been shown that institutional investors are inclined to 
hold stocks with very narrow characteristics (Gompers and Metrick (2001)). 
Therefore, funds with portfolios that have stocks with low institutional owner­
ship, will tend to be funds that innovate by researching and investing in stocks 
that are not in the radar of institutional investors. Furthermore, a fund whose 
portfolio has a lower value-weighted average of institutional ownership provides 
retail investors access to investment vehicles that explore different corners of 
the market. This, in turn, could be translated into greater diversification for 
retail investors. I define institutional ownership of a stock as the number of 
shares held by institutions (according to the 13F filings) divided by the total 
number of shares outstanding. Since institutional ownership is highly corre­
lated with size (Gompers and Metrick (2001), Nagel (2005), Garavito (2010)), 
I orthogonalize the institutional ownership with respect to size as in Garavito 
(2010)10. This calculates the component of institutional ownership that is not 
correlated with size. Subsequently, I rank the residual institutional ownership 
from highest to lowest and then group each quarterly cross-section in 20 groups 
where the first group (Rank =  1) has the stocks with the lowest residual in­
stitutional ownerships and the last group (Rank =  20) has the stocks with 
the largest residual institutional ownerships. I calculate the value-weighted 
average of the residual institutional ownership ranking of the stocks held by 
a mutual fund at a disclosure date. I regress this measure on dummies for 
incubated funds and for whether the observation is before or after a fund IPO. 
I find that incubated funds tend to invest in companies with less institutional 
ownership than non-incubated funds. The difference in means of the incu­
bated and non-incubated fund value-weighted average institutional ownership 
is -0.4461 (4.7% of the sample average). This shows that, during the incuba­
tion period, incubated funds tend to invest in stocks that are less popular with
10L o g i t ( O W N E R S H I P )  =  —7.31 +  1.68 Log size — 0.09 Log size2 +  e where e is the 
component of institutional ownership orthogonal to size.
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institutional investors than after their IPO.
I also compare the levels of portfolio turnover and the expense ratios. Port­
folio Turnover as defined by CRSP is the minimum of aggregated sales or 
aggregated purchases of securities, divided by the average 12-month total net 
assets (TNA) of the fund. The expense ratio is defined as Ratio of total invest­
ment that shareholders pay for the fund’s operating expenses, which include 
12b-l fees. For each fund, I obtain the portfolio turnover and expense ratio 
for the leading share class (First IPO, first inception date, largest TNA) of 
each fund. There is no clear difference between the portfolio turnover of an 
incubated fund during and after the incubation period. The expense ratio does 
not considerably change before and after the IPO. This helps rule out that the 
high pre-IPO returns of incubated funds is due to lower expense ratios or lower 
portfolio turnover.
The results above show that incubated funds change their investment be­
havior after going public. For example, incubated funds tend to hold more 
illiquid and lesser-known securities during the incubation. This provides ev­
idence showing that, by removing financial constraints related to capital re­
demptions, the incubation period allows funds to take on investment strategies 
(i.e. liquidity provision) that would not be implementable otherwise.
After the IPO: Incubated vs Non-incubated Funds
I also analyze the same portfolio characteristics as in the previous section 
for incubated and non-incubated funds and compare their post-IPO differ­
ences. The results are in Table 2.5. First, I study the liquidity of incubated 
and non-incubated fund portfolios. The difference in the value-weighted av­
erage turnover between incubated and non-incubated funds is -0.0065. After 
controlling for other factors, the previous difference changes to -0.0035 (2.7% 
of the sample average). This shows that incubated funds hold more illiquid 
stocks that non-incubated funds. The portfolio concentration of incubated 
and non-incubated funds is also different. The difference in Herfindahl Index 
between incubated and non-incubated funds in the post-IPO period is 0.0012 
(4.7% of the sample average) and statistically different from zero. I also find
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that incubated funds tend to hold stocks that are less popular with institu­
tional investors than non incubated funds. The difference in pre and post IPO 
means of the value-weighted average of institutional ownership for incubated 
funds is -0.098 (0.93% of the sample average). There does not seem to be sig­
nificant portfolio turnover differences between incubated and non-incubated 
funds after their IPO’s. Incubated funds do seem to have higher expense ra­
tios than non-incubated funds (the difference is 0.07% or 4.6% of the sample 
average).
The evidence in this subsection shows that, even after incubated funds go 
public and capital redemption rights are imposed, they remain unique when 
compared to new fund offerings that were not incubated. After their IPO ’s, 
incubated funds tend to hold more illiquid and lesser-know stocks and more 
concentrated portfolios than non-incubated funds. Two points are noteworthy. 
Firstly, incubated mutual funds tend to change their investment strategies af­
ter their IPO ’s, but not to a point where they are indistinguishable from other 
new fund offerings. Secondly, the under-diversification of incubated funds, can 
be explained in Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2008) framework where 
investors deviate from holding diversified portfolios if they can first collect 
information about assets systematically. In the case of incubated funds, the 
incubation period allows managers to collect and learn about assets without 
having to focus on their short-term performance. Consistent with this fact, I 
have shown tha t managers of incubated funds decide to learn about and invest 
in more marginal, lesser known firms where the benefits of collecting informa­
tion are the greatest. This, in turn, leads them to concentrate their efforts 
in smaller set of stocks and hence to have more concentrated portfolios than 
non-incubated funds. In other words, the evidence suggests that incubated 
funds use the incubation period to explore different corners of the market and 
that this learning has a lasting impact well after the IPO.
2 .3.3.2 Stock Picking Ability
Incubated Funds: Pre and Post IPO
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As explained before, the decline in risk-adjusted returns of incubated funds 
after the IPO could be explained due to financial constraints. However, it is 
unclear whether this reduction is also due to a decline in their ability to choose 
stocks. In order to try to measure stock picking ability of these funds, I study 
buy-and-hold strategies that buy the portfolio of each fund at their disclosure 
dates. This method gives us a better indication of whether a funds are good 
at picking stocks rather than looking at net returns which are influenced by 
other factors (liquidity management, fees, etc.). More specifically, I imple­
ment a trading strategy that buys the portfolio holdings of a mutual fund 
at portfolio disclosure date t and holds it until portfolio disclosure date t+1. 
I calculate the char act eristic-adjusted and excess returns of this strategy for 
all funds in my sample and compare their difference in means for incubated 
funds before and after their IPO ’s respectively. I do this by regressing the 
characteristic-adjusted (excess) return of this strategy for funds in my sample 
on INCUBATED, which is a dummy that equals one if the fund is incubated 
and zero otherwise and on PRE-IPO which is a dummy that equals one if the 
observation is before the IPO and zero otherwise. I employ observations that 
are within two years of the IPO date for each fund. Table 2.6 shows the results. 
As it can be seen, the difference in means of characteristic-adjusted (excess) 
returns (HOLDING-BASED) of incubated funds before and after their IPO’s 
is 0.46% (0.72%) per month. After controlling for size, flows investment style 
and style flows, this difference in characteristic-adjusted (excess) returns is 
equal to 0.39 % (0.47%) per month. This finding corroborates the results from 
Table 2.3. It is also interesting to see that the return on this trading strategy 
is negatively correlated with size which is consistent with Chen et al (2004) 
and Berk and Green (2004). In other words, funds have a decreasing returns 
to scale technology and are unable to keep up with the same level of returns 
as they grow. Another interesting finding is that the return of this trading 
strategy negatively covaries with style flow. This is a sign that as more capital 
is going after the same set of stocks, current prices are pushed up and expected 
returns down.
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A better test of the persistence of stock picking ability of incubated funds 
is to implement a buy-and-hold trading strategy based on the fund’s purchases 
and disposals of assets11. This trading strategy is based on active decisions 
taken by the manager and hence is a better reflection of the managers be­
liefs. To analyze mutual fund trades, I form portfolios based on the buys 
(BOUGHT) and sells (SOLD) of each mutual fund during disclosure times t-1 
and t. I follow Kacperczy Sialm and Zheng (2005) to construct the weights 
of the BOUGHT and SOLD portfolios respectively. The weights in each port­
folio are based on the intensity with which a manager sold/bought a stock 
between portfolio disclosures and are adjusted to control for momentum in 
the stock return. I hold these portfolios (BOUGHT, SOLD) until the next 
disclosure date (time t+ 1 ). These portfolios are then rebalanced as before. 
The differences between the mean characteristic-adjusted returns of incubated 
funds before and after their IPO ’s are 0.65% and 0.63% for BOUGHT and 
SOLD respectively. After controlling for size, flow, investment style flow and 
investment objectives, the differences in mean char act eristic-adjusted and ex­
cess returns decrease but still remain economically and statistically signifi­
cant (Characteristic-adjusted, BOUGHT: 0.62% SOLD: 0.54%; Excess-return, 
BOUGHT: 0.74%, SOLD: 0.55% ). The positive difference for the BOUGHT 
trading strategy indicates that incubated funds are better at purchasing stocks 
in the incubation period. On the other hand, the positive difference between 
the pre and post IPO SOLD trading strategies, show that incubated funds are 
better at selling stocks in the post-IPO period12. These results show that there 
is a transfer of skill between the pre and post IPO periods. This is consistent 
with a shift in focus after the IPO. While during the incubation period funds 
could concentrate only on researching and buying stocks, after the IPO, funds
n Chen Jegadeesh and Wermers (2000) argue that the active decision of trading on a 
stock is a better indication of the manager’s beliefs (and hence investment skill) than the 
passive decision of holding a stock, since the latter may be driven by non-performance related 
reasons such as concerns over transaction costs and capital gains taxes.
12 A positive difference means that a portfolio based on pre-IPO disposals generates a larger 
return than that of a portfolio based on post-ipo disposals. This indicates that, during the 
incubation period, incubation funds sell assets to quickly relative to their post-IPO selling 
actions.
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also have to focus on realizing capital gains and liquidity management of the 
fund in order to meet future expected redemptions.
After the IPO: Incubated vs Non-Incubated Funds
One of the main points in prior studies is that incubated funds do not de­
liver higher returns than non-incubated funds. It is therefore concluded that 
incubated funds do not have better managerial ability than non-incubated 
funds. As in the previous sub-section , I look at managerial skill by looking at 
the performance of a buy-and-hold strategies based on the holdings, purchases 
and disposals of new funds. The difference between the post-IPO trading 
strategies based on holdings of incubated and non-incubated funds is positive 
but not statistically different than zero (characteristic-adjusted 0.13%, excess 
return 0.18% per month). This seems to support the hypothesis of no difference 
in managerial ability between incubated and non incubated funds. However, 
when I look at trading strategies based on the portfolio changes, I obtain dif­
ferent results. The differences in means of post-IPO characteristic-adjusted 
returns of the trading strategies for incubated and non incubated funds are 
0.35% and 0.27% a month for BOUGHT and SOLD respectively. After con­
trolling for size, flows, flows to the investment style and investment style the 
differences are 0.31% and 0.21% for BOUGHT and SOLD respectively. The 
strategy based on the disposals of each fund (SOLD) is not statistically signifi­
cant and therefore it is inconclusive. The positive mean difference between the 
characteristic-adjusted returns of the incubated and non-incubated BOUGHT 
strategies tells us that incubated funds are better at buying stocks than non- 
incubated stocks. This evidence shows that, when looking at active decisions 
of fund managers, there is a difference in managerial ability between incubated 
and non-incubated funds.
2.3.4 Fund Flows
As we have previously seen, families launch their incubated funds when their 
returns are above the industry median. If families engaged in this strategy to 
exploit the positive relationship between past performance and flows, it would
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be plausible to believe that, holding everything else constant, incubated funds 
would attract more relative inflows than non-incubated funds due to their pre- 
IPO returns. Figure 2.2 compares the relative fund flows to incubated and 
non-incubated funds and their TNA evolution for the first 24 months after 
the IPO. The figure shows two main patterns. Firstly, relative fund flows to 
non-incubated funds are larger than those of incubated funds in the first 12 
months post-IPO. The net fund flows to non-incubated and incubated funds 
in the second year seem to be similar. Secondly the average TNA of non- 
incubated funds is larger than that of incubated funds. However, this gap 
shrinks with time. The difference between the rates at which incubated and 
non-incubated funds’ assets grow, could be due to their fund families. Ta­
ble 2.7 describes the average family size and number of funds decile of new 
fund offerings. These variables are calculated for each new fund at the IPO 
date. Panel A shows that non-incubated funds belong to larger families than 
Incubated funds. Panel B shows that non-incubated funds belong to more 
populated families than incubated funds. Therefore, the difference mentioned 
above could be due to the fact that large families are likely to have better 
distribution channels through larger broker networks and well-established re­
lationships with institutional investors. Better distributions channels would 
ensure that new fund offerings reach wider audiences in a shorter period of 
time. This increases the likelihood that non-incubated funds attract more 
inflows than incubated funds very early on.
Table 2.8 formally studies the determinants of net fund flows for new fund 
offering in the first two years after their IPO ’s. I regress the monthly relative 
fund flows of each new fund offering on the past month return decile, the 
family size decile, investment style dummies, the natural logarithm of net 
fund flows to the investment style of each fund and a dummy tha t equals one 
if the fund was incubated and zero otherwise. Panel A shows the results using 
the observations within 2 years after IPO. As we can see from the univariate 
regressions, return, family size, relative flows to the investment style explain 
relative fund flows in the first two years of a fund. The coefficients on return
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decile and on relative flows to the investment style have signs consistent with 
previous results in the literature. The coefficient on family size is positive and 
highly significant. For instance a one decile change in family size decile explains 
approximately a 0.3% monthly increase in TNA due to relative capital flows. 
The multivariate regression shows a similar picture. As predicted in Figure 
2.2, incubated funds tend to receive around 1% less in relative fund flows 
than non incubated funds. Panel B runs the same regressions for observations 
within one year after IPO. From this panel, we can conclude that the negative 
effect of incubation on funds is more pronounced (incubated funds receive 
on average around 2.3% less relative fund flows than non-incubated funds) 
during the first year. Panel C runs the same regression specifications using 
observations in the second year after the IPO. The results indicate that the 
negative effect of incubation on relative flows disappears while family size is less 
important in statistical and economic terms. We can conclude that economies 
of scale (larger distribution network) work very well in drawing relative fund 
flows to new fund offerings in the first year. However, this advantage seem 
to vanish in the second year of the fund. The negative coefficient on the 
incubation dummy shows that performance in the incubation period does not 
seem to help draw inflows to the fund. This can have several explanations. 
First, investors in incubated funds may be agnostic about high pre-IPO return 
histories. Investors know that returns in the incubation period were obtained 
without financial constraints imposed by redemption rights. It could also be 
that fund families cater to investors’ demand. In this case, non-incubation 
could be an opportunistic attem pt to satisfy short-lived investors’ demand 
shocks for a particular investment style. If investors tend to chase investment 
styles that are in vogue to a greater extent than they pursue past performance, 
the catering hypothesis would help explain the difference in fund flows between 
incubated and non-incubated funds.
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2.4 Conclusion
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that incubated funds behave 
differently in the pre and post IPO periods. Incubated funds seem to take 
advantage of the long-term commitment of investors and the lack of payoff 
complementarities in the pre-IPO period to implement investment strategies 
that may be risky in the interim but that have positive payoffs if held to ” ma­
turity” (i.e. liquidity provision). Incubated funds also take more concentrated 
bets and invest in stocks that are not part of the typical institutional investor 
stock universe. I also present evidence showing that incubated funds tend to 
behave strategically when choosing IPO dates. Incubated funds are offered to 
the public when their 12-month past performance peaks. Shortly after being 
launched, their performance declines back to the median performance. Fur­
thermore, I showed that non-incubated funds tend to attract more investment 
dollars relative to incubated funds in the first post-IPO year. I also show 
that difference disappears after the first post-IPO year. Additionally, I docu­
ment that families play a role in attracting investment funds to their new fund 
offerings.
This findings show that, the self-selection bias in the sample may not be the 
only reason that explains the high performance of incubated funds in the incu­
bation period. During the incubation period, incubated funds pursue strategies 
that can only be implemented if there are no investors that can withdrawal 
funds on demand. Once funds go public, they must keep a certain level of 
liquidity to meet potential withdraw. My results also show that funds can use 
the incubation period to try and research new stocks. This is reflected in the 
levels of concentration of incubated funds. The findings also show that incu­
bated funds invest in stocks that are less popular with institutional investors 
than stocks held by other new fund offerings. This is a very important feature 
for retail investors as some of them only have access to capital markets through 
institutional investors (pension funds, mutual funds, retirement accounts). By 
exposing investors to other stocks, incubated mutual funds help investors gain
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exposure to other sources of risk, thereby enhancing their portfolio diversifica­
tion.
The differences between incubated and non-incubated funds illustrate that 
fund families utilize fund incubation as a way to offer something different 
to investors. This innovation could be a new fund manager with no prior 
track record, or a new investment strategy that has not been tested/well- 
understood. In other words, fund innovation is a way to ’’incubate” ideas in a 
controlled environment. Only after a fund investment strategies have proved 
their potential, they are offered to investors. Innovating while having to ac­
count for payoff complementarities that investors face and the costs associated 
with performance-induced outflows may not be feasible for managers of new 
funds.
The evidence presented also suggests that incubated funds do tend to time 
their IPO ’s. While fund incubation may be a conduit for innovation in the 
mutual fund industry, the incentives to launch funds when they outperform and 
to liquidate them when their returns are high remain. W hat it is interesting 
to see is that this decline does not happen automatically. Incubated funds 
are able to maintain their 12-month performance above the industry level for 
sometime after the first year. During this time incubated funds have an edge 
in stock picking ability and in total returns as previously shown. However, 
liquidity management and payoff complementarities become more important 
as the fund grows pushing the fund’s performance back to the industry mean.
The last contribution of this paper also shows that incubated funds attract 
less relative fund flows than non-incubated funds. The obvious question is then, 
why do fund families incubate funds? As explained before, fund incubation is 
the perfect setting for fund families to try new ideas and managers. However, 
their strategic behavior in choosing IPO dates reveal the fact tha t they try to 
launch their incubated funds when it is optimal, i.e. when they are likely to 
maximize fund inflows. It remains interesting to understand what is special 
about non-incubated funds when it comes to attract relative fund flows. It 
could be that non-incubated funds are launched to cater to investors demands.
78
For instance, suppose that investors are demanding growth funds. It would 
then be natural to expect fund families to fill the gap between demand and 
supply. This in turn would cause more flows to the growth investment style 
and would encourage more families to offer new growth funds. This could be 
exacerbated by the dynamics of competition of fund families for investment 
dollars13. Families that are able to offer investors a wide arrange of investment 
options that exploit investors time varying demand will be in a better position 
to attract investment funds. The catering to investors by asset managers and 
its implications remain an interesting area for future research.
13Massa (2003) argues that fund families exploit investors heterogeneity by offering them 
the possibility to switch between sibling funds at no cost. He also finds evidence showing 
that the more mutual funds families can differentiate from one another, the less they need 
to compete in terms of performance.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
This table displays the mean, the median the standard deviation the minimum and the maximum of the Total Net Assets (TNA) for 
funds in the sample at or around (+ 3 months) the time of their IPO. It also displays the same statistics for the incubation period 
length measured in months. The TNA is based on the assets under management for the largest, oldest share class for each fund.
Incubated Funds (N =  214) Non-incubated Funds (N =  591)
TNA (in Millions) Incubation Period (Months) TNA (in Millions) Incubation Period (Months)
Mean 14.69 25.14 47.84 2.84
Median 10.17 23.00 16.10 1.00
Standard Deviation 25.76 11.67 172.60 3.35
Min 0.10 13.00 0.10 -3.00
Max 310.70 73.00 2645.80 12.00
00
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Table 2.2: Investment Objectives
This table displays the Lipper investment objectives of funds in the sample 
as of 1999 or later. Frequency is the number of new fund offerings during the 
sample period. Percent is the percentage of new fund offerings with respect 
to the total new fund offerings in each category (incubated and non-incubated 
funds) over the sample period .
Incubated Funds Non-incubated Funds
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Difference
Capital Appreciation 11 5.1% 26 4.4% 0.7%
Equity Income 4 1.9% 11 1.9% 0.0%
Financial Services 3 1.4% 11 1.9% -0.5%
Flexible Portfolio 1 0.5% 1 0 .2% 0.3%
Growth 76 35.5% 227 38.4% -2.9%
Growth and Income 35 16.4% 47 8.0% 8.4%
Health /  Biotechnology 5 2.3% 23 3.9% -1.6%
Mid Cap 30 14.0% 63 10.7% 3.4%
Micro Cap 3 1.4% 8 1.4% 0.0%
Specialty/Miscellaneous 2 0.9% 11 1.9% -0.9%
Small Cap 38 17.8% 113 19.1% -1.4%
Science Technology 5 2.3% 47 8.0% -5.6%
Utility 1 0.5% 3 0.5% 0.0%
Table 2.3: Average Alpha and Factor Loadings for New Funds
This table displays the mean of regression coefficients and risk-adjusted alphas for funds in my sample. It also calculates the 
differences in factor loadings and 4-factor alphas for incubated and non-incubated funds. Panel A uses 36 months of data of monthly 
excess returns from the inception of the fund (the date the fund was created). Panel B uses 36 months of data from the IPO date 
onwards (after the fund applies and obtains a NASDAQ ticker), t-statistics are in parentheses.
Intercept Rm-Rf SMB HML UMD Average R
Panel A: 36 Months of Data Since Inception
Non-incubated Funds 0 .02% 1.071 0.219 -0.047 0.042 88.03%
(0.58) (90.45) (13.84) -(2.48) (5.12)
Incubated Funds 0.23% 1.001 0.197 0.034 0.013 85.79%
(4.44) (69.17) (8.08) (0.98) (0.91)
Difference -0 .22% 0.070 0.021 -0.081 0.029 2.24%
-(3.69) (3.72) (0.73) -(2.06) (1.79) (2.78)
Panel A: 36 Months of Data Since IPO
Non-incubated Funds -0.03% 1.065 0.224 -0.050 0.033 88.11%
-(1.37) (91.48) (14.49) -(2.70) (3.96)
Incubated Funds 0.06% 1.013 0.195 0.020 0.015 87.19%
(1.36) (68.23) (8.29) (0.63) (0.70)
Difference -0.09% 0.052 0.029 -0.070 0.018 0.92%
-(1.85) (2.73) (1.04) -(1.91) (0.75) (1.15)
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Table 2.4: R e tu rn  Decile R egression
Dependent variable is the 12-month return decile of fund i at time t. N is the 
difference between date t and the IPO date. The regression is run for incubated 
funds where the difference between date t  and the IPO date E [—24,24]. LOG 
TNA is the average log TNA of mutual fund i’s TNA at time t. FLOW is the 
average relative log flow of fund i at time t. STYLE FLOW is the average log 
flow to the investment style of mutual fund i at time t. Averages are calculated 
between time t and time t-11.1 is the indicator function, t-statistics are in 
parentheses.
R E T U R N  D E C IL E ^  = a  + A  JV l^ c o  +  A M * ift>o +  7 C O N T R O L S  +  e*>t
MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 MODEL5 MODEL6
INTERCEPT 6.55 1.88 6.06 6.17 3.73
N%Ni,t< o 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.05
(8.32) (7.14) (6.34) (7.59) (5.43) (5.47)
o -0.04 -0.06 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
-(6.94) -(10.22) -(3.60) -(6.81) -(5.36) -(5.15)
LOG ASSETS 0.31 0.13 0.12
(10.66) (4.85) (4.53)
FLOW 6.90 5.53 5.44
(14.31) (11.88) (11.75)
STYLE FLOW 1.27 1.18 1.17
(26.06) (24.05) (22.93)
Fund Styles N N N N N Y
Table 2.5: Characteristics of Stocks Held by New M utual Funds
INCUBATED is a dummy equal to one if fund i is incubated and zero otherwise. PRE IPO is a dummy variable equal to one if observation at time 
t for fund i is before than the fund’s IPO. INTERACTION is and interaction term between INCUBATED and PRE IPO date. TURNOVER is the 
value weighted average stock turnover of stocks held by mutual fund i at time t. Stock turnover is the average turnover (volume/shares outstanding) of 
a stock in the last 3 months (t-2, t-1, and t). HERFINDAHL is the Herfindahl index for mutual fund i at time t. INST OWN is the value weighted 
average rank of the orthogonalized logit institutional ownership of stocks held by mutual fund i at time t. The logit of the institutional ownership of a 
stock is defined as log (  i ~ o \ v n § Ks h T p ) • orthogonalized logit of institutional ownership of stock i, is defined as the epsilon of the folloging equation:
L o g i t { p W N E R S H I P )  =  —7.31 +  1.68 Log size — 0.09 Log size2 +  e, where OWNERSHIP is the percentage of institutional ownership and size is the 
market capitalization of stock i at time t. PORT TURNOEVER, is the portfolio turnover of mutual fund i at time t. EXPENSE is the expense ratio of 
mutual fund i at time t. LOG ASSETS is the natural logarithm of fund i assets under management at time t. FLOW is the average monthly relative net 
fund flows of fund i between portfolio disclosures dates. STYLE FLOW is the average monthly net fund flows between fund’s i portfolio disclosures dates 
of the investment style to which fund i belongs. Relative net fund flow is defined as in Pollet and Wilson (2007). Fund Styles are defined as in Table 2.2. 
t-statistics are in parentheses.
Y  =  a  +  f c l N C U B A T E D  +  f a P R E J P O  +  f c l N C U B A T E D  x P R E J P O  +  7C O N T R O L S  +  e
TURNOVER TURNOVER HERFINDAHL HERFINDAHL INST OWN INST OWN PORT TURNOVER PORT TURNOVER EXPENSE EXPENSE
INTERCEPT 0.137 0.025 11.919 1.564 0.015
INCUBATED -0.0065 -0.0035 0.0003 0.0012 -0.0490 -0.0986 -0.2500 -0.1343 0.0006 0.0007
-(3.67) -(2.09) (0.64) (2.75) -(1.10) -(2.38) -(2.17) -(1.17) (2.63) (2.95)
PRE IPO -0.0027 -0.0034 0.0025 0.0005 -0.7213 -0.7555 -1.0487 -1.0262 0.0009 -0.0001
-(0.59) -(0.74) (2.05) (0.41) -(6.15) -(6.76) -(1.21) -(1.19) (0.64) -(0.06)
INTERACTION -0.0115 -0.0099 -0.0006 -0.0004 0.3134 0.3095 0.9726 0.8770 -0.0006 0.0000
-(2.16) -(1.95) -(0.41) -(0.28) (2.35) (2.49) (1.10) (1.00) -(0.45) (0.00)
LOG ASSETS 0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0833 -0.0676 -0.0003
(2.65) -(10.83) -(7.54) -(2.02) -(4.10)
FLOW 0.0054 0.0005 -0.1940 0.0411 0.0005
(2.22) (0.74) -(3.27) (0.10) (0.82)
STYLE FLOW 0.1633 0.0011 -18.4539 -18.2857 -0.0189
(2.52) (0.06) -(11.60) -(3.09) -(1.94)
P2 + Pi -0.0142 -0.0132 0.0020 0.0001 -0.4079 -0.4461 -0.0761 -0.1492 0.0002 -0.0001
Pi +  Pi =  0 p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.86 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.40 0.48 0.83
Fund Styles - Y - Y - Y - Y - Y
Table 2.6: Stock Picking Ability of New Funds
Dependent variable is the return of a HOLDINGS-BASED and TRADING-BASED buy-and-hold trading strategy. The HOLDINGS-BASED strategy buys 
the portfolio of mutual fund i at time t, and holds it until time t + 1. The TRADING-BASED strategy implements a trading strategy between time t and 
t+1 that is based on the trades between time t-1 and t of fund i. Time t-1, t and t+ l are subsequent portfolio disclosure dates for mutual fund i. DGTW 
RET is the characteristic adjusted trading strategy return as in Daniel Grinblatt Titman and Wermers (1997). RET-RF is the excess return of the trading 
strategy. BOUGHT (SOLD) is a trading strategy that buys at time t the the purchases (disposals) of fund i between time t-1 and t. This portfolio is held 
until time t+1. The portfolio weights for BOUGHT and SOLD are as in Kacperczyk Sialm Zheng (2005). Trading strategies are only based on CRSP 
U.S. common stocks traded in NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ held by mutual funds. Independent variables are defined as in Table 2.5. Stock returns are 
corrected for the delisting bias present in CRSP following Shumway (1997) and Shumway and Warther (1999). t-statistics are in parentheses.
Y  =  a  +  p J N C U B A T E D  +  f a P R E J P O  +  f a l N C U B A T E D  x P R E J P O  +  7C O N T R O L S  +  e
HOLDINGS-BASED STRATEGY TRADING-BASED STRATEGY
DGTW RET-RF
DGTW RET-RF BOUGHT SOLD BOUGHT SOLD BOUGHT SOLD BOUGHT SOLD
INTERCEPT -0.91% -1.05% -1.05% -1.10% -1.15% -1.20%
-(13.47) -(11.70) -(11.94) -(12.47) -(9.94) -(11.16)
INCUBATED 0.20% 0.13% 0.36% 0.18% 0.35% 0.27% 0.31% 0.21% 0.37% 0.33% 0.24% 0.21%
(1.60) (1.01) (2.19) (1.10) (2.36) (1.82) (2.08) (1.40) (1.92) (1.83) (1.23) (1.16)
PRE IPO 0.24% 0.11% -0.57% -0.97% 0.62% -0.37% 0.49% -0.63% -0.53% -1.33% -1.12% -1.98%
(0.73) (0.31) -(1.31) -(2.17) (0.63) -(0.37) (0.49) -(0.63) -(0.40) -(1.09) -(0.86) -(1.64)
INTERACTION 0.22% 0.28% 1.29% 1.44% 0.03% 1.00% 0.13% 1.17% 1.48% 2.12% 1.86% 2.53%
(0.58) (0.74) (2.60) (2.89) (0.02) (0.98) (0.13) (1.15) (1.10) (1.69) (1.39) (2.05)
LOG ASSETS -0.001 -0.003 0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004
-(1.82) -(6.26) -(0.90) -(2.93) -(5.48) -(6.86)
FLOW 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.003 0.007 0.003
(0.61) (0.08) -(0.20) -(0.59) (1.02) (0.50)
STYLE FLOW -0.163 -0.340 -0.281 -0.330 -0.535 -0.513
-(3.33) -(5.33) -(4.16) -(4.90) -(6.10) -(6.33)
P2 +  @3 0.46% 0.39% 0.72% 0.47% 0.65% 0.63% 0.62% 0.54% 0.95% 0.79% 0.74% 0.55%
Pi +  @3 =  0 p-value 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05
Fund Styles - Y - Y - - Y Y - - Y Y
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Table 2.7: F und  Fam ily C h a rac te ris tic s
This table presents differences in means of family characteristics of new funds. 
Panel A shows the difference in means of the number of member funds decile 
of families that have launched new funds. Panel B exhibits the difference in 
means of the assets under management decile of families that have launched 
new funds, t-statistics are in parentheses.
Mean











Table 2.8: Fund Flow Regressions
Dependent variable, F L O W ij,is the relative net fund flows of fund i at 
time t . Relative net fund flow is defined as in Pollet and Wilson (2007). 
R E T U R N  D E C  I  LE ijt is the monthly return decile of fund i at time t-1. 
F A M IL Y S IZ E D E C IL E i)t is the assets under management decile at time 
t of the family to which fund i belongs. LOG F L O W  S T Y  LE^t is the rela­
tive fund flows at time t to the investment objective to which fund i belongs. 
INCUBATED is a dummy that equals one if fund i was incubated and zero 
otherwise, t-statistics are in parentheses.
MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 MODEL5 MODEL6 MODEL7
Panel A: 1 - 24 Months After IPO
INTERCEPT 0.021 0.013 0.034 0.040 -0.002 0.000 0.006
(5.59) (2.06) (17.87) (18.06) -(0.33) (0.01) (0.74)
RETURN DECILE 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
(4.99) (4.98) (3.38) (3.43)
FAMILY SIZE DECILE 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002
(3.70) (3.70) (3.69) (3.10)




Panel B: 1 - 12 Months After IPO
INTERCEPT 0.043 0.022 0.056 0.068 0.005 0.006 0.021
(6.73) (2.08) (17.10) (17.92) (0.42) (0.54) (1.63)
RETURN DECILE 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
(3.14) (3.15) (2.25) (2.35)
FAMILY SIZE DECILE 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004
(3.69) (3.70) (3.67) (2.77)




Panel C: 13 - 24 Months After IPO
INTERCEPT 0.002 0.002 0.014 0.014 -0.011 -0.008 -0.009
(0.44) (0.24) (6.75) (5.98) -(1.37) -(0.97) -(1.11)
RETURN DECILE 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(3.81) (3.80) (2.52) (2.51)
FAMILY SIZE DECILE 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(1.85) (1.83) (1.82) (1.90)





A Catering Explanation of  
M utual Fund IPOs
3.1 Introduction
Style valuations and style inflows predict mutual fund launches. The launches 
so predicted rarely outperform either their style benchmark or the universe of 
substitute funds and take place at their valuation peak . Our results imply 
that the marginal investor in equity mutual funds is precisely the least well- 
informed about investment opportunities.
The catering theory of Baker and Wurgler (2004) is applicable to a large 
range of corporate actions, including the decision to launch new mutual funds. 
In an efficient market, in which all investors are rational and informed, such 
launches should only take place in response to genuine investment opportu­
nities where the previous range of products failed to span the space of asset 
payoffs given transactions costs. By contrast, in an inefficient market, shocks 
to the demands of poorly informed investors (Frazzini and Lamont’s (2008) 
“dumb money” investors) will call forth a supply of essentially useless finan­
cial products designed to capture a share of the fees likely to be generated 
by these investors’ relatively poorly informed decisions. The new funds so 
called forth are useless first because there are close substitutes already in exis­
tence and secondly because they proliferate the number of products, increasing
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94
search and other costs for all investors.
Mutual fund providers introduce new funds in two different ways. Funds 
either go from conception to birth very swiftly (non-incubated) or are first 
managed only with seed capital from the provider (incubated) until a subse­
quent IPO is arranged. Despite the obvious problems posed by incubation *, 
incubation of funds is less likely to involve highly opportunistic provision of 
publicly investable funds solely in response to perceived demand by investors. 
We show tha t although our chosen demand indicators are very good at pre­
dicting mutual fund launches in general, and non-incubated fund launches in 
particular, they are much less able to predict the decision to go public for 
incubated investment funds.
If investors inflows are “sticky” (Choi, Laibson and Madrian (2007)) then 
opportunistic fund launches can permanently increase fee income to fund 
providers even in the absence of providing a genuinely useful service. In con­
sequence, catering to short-lived investor demand shocks can permanently in­
crease the population of mutual funds and can potentially explain the vast 
population of mutual funds relative to the relatively small variety of inde­
pendent equity investment strategies that have been shown to produce high 
average returns. This explanation for the proliferation of mutual funds has 
obvious implications for hedge funds and structured financial products.
We also document that the dynamics of expected fund flows to new funds 
is conditional on investors’ demand for investment styles. More specifically, we 
show that the positive relationship between past performance and current flows 
decreases as demand for the investment style at the time of the IPO increases. 
Additionally, the positive relationship between past investment style flows and 
flows to new mutual funds increases as investment style demand at the time 
of the IPO increases. These changes are stronger in the first year after the 
IPO. Therefore, when demand for an investment style is high (when catering
1 Evans (2009) discusses how fund families have the incentive to launch only incubated 
funds with outstanding past performance so as to benefit from the convex relationship 
between past performance and current flows. Palmiter and Taha (2009) discuss the current 
regulatory framework for incubated funds
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is more likely to happen), the importance of investor sentiment (as measured 
by flows into the style) in determining expected flows to new funds increases 
where as the significance of past performance declines.
Finally, we show that without such IPOs, mutual fund providers would 
miss out on capturing hot money style flows. IPOs increase the level and 
persistence of flows into hot styles, consistent with an attention-grabbing role 
for such launches. IPOs are perhaps the most important tool for mutual fund 
providers to attract and retain dumb money investment.
Our paper builds on the earlier work of Khorana and Servaes (1999) and 
Evans (2009), who use industrial organization arguments to explain the prob­
ability to launch a new fund by a family, but who do not consider demand 
shocks as the primary determinant of total new mutual fund offerings. Our 
paper is also related to the literature on IPO waves and IPO timing. Pas­
tor and Veronesi (2005) construct a rational model where entrepreneurs time 
their IPO offerings when market conditions are favorable. Loughran and Rit­
ter (1995) show that the number of stock IPO ’s in hot IPO markets are due to 
greater investment optimism. Baker and Wurgler (2000) find evidence of stock 
issuance timing by corporations and Lowry (2002) finds that fluctuations in 
investor sentiment explains the fluctuations in IPO issuance. Lee Shleifer and 
Thaler (1991) show that discounts of closed-end funds vary with investor sen­
timent and that the number of new closed-end fund offerings fluctuates with 
the closed-end fund discount.
Our paper is also related to the catering literature. Baker and Wur­
gler (2004) present evidence that managers cater to investors by paying divi­
dends when investors most want to hold dividend-paying securities. Polk and 
Sapienza (2008) find evidence that stock market mispricing affects the level 
of firms set their investment policies since managers know that investors pay 
a premium for companies with high levels of investment. Baker Greenwood 
and Wurgler (2007) propose and test a catering theory of nominal stock prices 
whereby investors prefer low-price firms and therefore managers maintain share 
prices at lower levels.
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This study complements earlier work in mutual fund proliferation. Massa 
(1998) argues that market segmentation and fund proliferation can be seen as 
marketing strategies used by the families to exploit investors’ heterogeneity. 
Massa (2003) finds that the degree of product segmentation has a positive 
effect on mutual fund proliferation.
This paper is also linked to research in the effect of investor sentiment on 
mutual fund flows. Goetzmann Massa Rouwenhorst (1999) document that 
flows to different investment styles may be associated to investor sentiment 
about the equity premium. Brown Goetzmann Hiraki Shiraishi and Watanabe 
(2002) find evidence that daily mutual fund flows may be a proxy for investor 
sentiment. They also propose an index to measure market sentiment based on 
how investors move funds in and out of different styles. Frazzini and Lamont 
(2008) find evidence that investor sentiment for stocks, as measured by mutual 
fund flows, forecast future returns.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 3.2 describes our data; 
section 3.3 describes our results; section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 D ata
Our sample starts in January 1996 and ends in December 2005. We calculate 
the inception date2 of a mutual fund by looking at the inception dates of its 
share classes3. We calculate the inception date of a mutual fund share class 
as the minimum date between the date of its first monthly return observation 
and the “first offered date” variable from the CRSP Survivor-Bias Free US 
Mutual Fund dataset. We identify the share classes associated with each fund 
and calculate the inception date of the fund as the minimum inception date 
of its share classes. As a proxy for mutual fund share class IPO date, we use
2This is the date on which the SEC has approved the N-8A and N-lA forms of a new 
fund.
3Mutual funds usually issue several share classes. Shares classes are claims to the same 
underlying portfolio with different fee structures.
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NASDAQ mutual fund ticker creation dates4. We calculate the IPO date of 
a mutual fund as the minimum IPO date of its share classes. We match the 
CRSP Survivor-Bias Free US Mutual Fund and the NASD datasets by match­
ing NASDAQ tickers within 24 month of the mutual fund share class IPO. For 
funds with more than one match5, we manually choose the appropriate match. 
Following Evans (2009), we keep only those funds that have an inception date 
that is greater than or equal to January 1 of 19966. A fund is considered to 
be incubated if the difference between the IPO date and the fund’s inception 
date is more than 12 calendar months. Funds that do not meet this criterion 
are considered to be non-incubated.
We obtain mutual fund data from the CRSP Survivorship-Bias Free U.S. 
Mutual Fund Database and from the Thompson Financial Mutual Fund Database 
(S13). A sample of actively managed US equity funds is constructed in four 
steps. First, index funds are filtered out from the CRSP Survivor-Bias Free 
U.S. Mutual Fund Database. Secondly, we eliminate funds (FUNDNO’S) that 
have reporting gaps of more than 12 months7 from the Thompson Financial 
Dataset (S13). Thirdly, we exclude funds that on average do not hold at least 
80% of NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ common stocks from the Thompson Financial 
Mutual Fund Database (S13). Lastly, we merge these two datasets (CRSP and 
Thompson) by using the MFLINKS provided by WRDS.
Return and stock information data are from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) Monthly Stocks File for NYSE, Amex, and NAS­
DAQ stocks. We eliminate closed-end funds, real estate investment trusts 
(REIT), American Depository Receipts (ADR), foreign companies, primes,
4When a new fund is first sold to the public, the fund sponsor or family applies for a 
NASDAQ ticker. The NASD keeps a record of the date that each fund’s ticker was created. 
Our sample consists of annual snapshots of currently active tickers taken each January from 
1999 to 2006. Therefore, if a fund were terminated before 1999 or if a fund were started and 
terminated between the January snapshots, the fund would not have to be included in the 
NASD data. See Evans (2009) for more information.
5Some Nasdaq tickers are recycled, therefore it is possible to match a unique CRSP fund 
share class identifier (crsp fundno) with more than one ticker - ipo date pair
6This allows funds at the beginning of our sample to be incubated for at least 3 years.
7These funds are suspect as Thompson usually recycles unique fund identifiers. See 
WRDS User’s Guide to Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund and Investment Company Common 
Stock Holdings Databases (July 2008).
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and scores. To correct returns for delisting bias, we use the adjustment pro­
posed in Shumway (1997) and Shumway and Warther (1999) for NYSE/AMEX 
and NASDAQ respectively. The book value of equity in the numerator of the 
book-to-market ratio (B/M) is taken from the Compustat Database as defined 
in Daniel and Titm an (2006). At the end of each quarter t, we calculate B/M 
as the book value of equity from the most recent fiscal year-end that is preced­
ing quarter-end t by at least six months divided by the market value of equity 
at the end of quarter t. Consistent with Fama and French (1993), we exclude 
firms with negative book values. The Book-to-Market ratio of the S&P 500 
index is retrieved from Bloomberg.
We construct the monthly investment style book-to-market ratio for the 
styles in our sample by calculating the monthly value-weighted average book- 
to-market ratio of stocks that fall in each investment style. Table 3.4 explains 
how the universe of stocks for each investment style is defined.
Tables 3.1 through 3.3 document the characteristics of our sample. Table 
3.1 shows the summary statistics for the investment styles in the sample. A 
couple of things are noteworthy. The correlation between investment style 
flows and return is positive. Since flows tend to be persistent, this shows a 
positive relation between performance and flows. The market capitalization 
of each investment style is negatively correlated with its book-to-market ratio. 
Large investment styles (i.e. Growth) will have companies th a t on average 
have low book-to-market ratios. Table 3.2 summarizes the mutual fund char­
acteristics of funds in our sample. It is important to note that investment style 
flows and fund returns are correlated. Since fund returns are correlated with 
the return of their investment styles, the correlation between investment style 
returns and fund flows shows that investors send their money to styles that 
have done well (Warther (1995)).
Moreover the age of a fund is negatively correlated with its relative flows 
and its investment style flows. This show early evidence tha t funds tend to 
be launched when sentiment is high and that as time goes by and sentiment 
changes, so change the dynamics of expected flows. Table 3.3 breakdown the
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number of new fund offerings in our sample by investment style. As we can 
see, growth has the most number of new offerings during the sample. This is to 
be expected as growth was a very popular investment style during part of our 
sample. It is also interesting to note that most of the funds in our sample are 
non-incubated (73%). Therefore, non-incubation is by far the prefered method 
that families use to launch new mutual funds.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Determ inants of the Num ber of Fund IPO s
We want to establish whether measures of investors’ demand and investment 
style valuation can explain the average number of new fund offerings. As we 
can see in Figure 1, the number of new funds offerings covaries positively with 
the Market-to-Book ratio of the market portfolio (S&P 500 Index). In other 
words, when valuations are very high, the number of new funds that come to 
market is higher than average and vice versa. In order to explore this fact, we 
run Poisson regressions on the number of funds that are launched each month 
in our sample on valuation metrics and investor demand. As a valuation met­
ric, we use the book-to-market ratio of each investment style in our sample. 
The relative investment fund flows relative8 to each investment style in our 
sample serves as a proxy for investors’ demand for each investment style. The 
results are presented in Table 3.5. In the first column, we regress the number 
of all new funds in each month on lagged book-to-market ratios for the market 
portfolio after controlling for net dollar flows into the mutual fund industry. 
The average number of total funds that IPO covaries negatively with previous 
book-to market ratios. A one standard deviation increase in the S&P 500 B/M  
ratio (valuation decreases), leads to a 33% decline in the expected number of 
new funds. In other words, when valuations are high (the book-to-market- 
ratio of the market portfolio is low) the number of expected new funds that
8 Relative flows are defined as f lo w i j  =  log ) — 1°6 (1 +  Ri,t)
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IPO is high and vice versa. The same picture emerges when we disaggregate 
the data and examine it at the investment style level. This controls for the het­
erogeneity found in the data (i.e. whether the result depends on a particular 
investment style). Columns two and three show that the number of expected 
new funds that are launched, depends on the valuation and the demand for 
each investment style. In column four, we control for other covariates (relative 
return ranking, style size and the overall valuation of the market). We see that 
after controlling for other variables, we still see the same covariation pattern 
between lagged valuation of and demand for an investment style and the ex­
pected number of funds that IPO. The effect is statistically and economically 
significant. A one standard deviation increase in the investment style book- 
to-market ratio leads to a 17% decrease in the number of expected number of 
funds that are offered to the public in a particular month. A one standard 
deviation increase in the relative net flows to an investment style leads to an 
increase of 21% in the number of new funds tha t IPO.
Catering to investors will depend on how fast new funds can be launched. 
This could be a lengthy process due to registration requirements9. Therefore, 
it is natural to think that most of the funds that are offered to uninformed 
investors are non-incubated. Next, we disaggregate the data by whether funds 
were incubated or not and investigate if the catering hypothesis is stronger for 
non-incubated funds. Columns 5 and 6 of Table 3.5 present the results. We see 
that the number of non-incubated funds depends on past levels of valuation of 
and demand for investment styles. The result is also economically significant. 
A one standard deviation increase in the investment style book-to-market ratio 
decreases the expected number of new non-incubated funds by 20.5%. On 
the other hand a one standard deviation increase in the style flow leads to a 
27% increase in the number of new non-incubated funds. The past levels of
9In the U.S., once a family has decided to launch a fund, they have to notify the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (S.E.C.) of the registration (Form N-8A). The family has to file 
the registration statement (Form N-1A) with the SEC within three months after the filing of 
the N-8A form. Upon receiving these forms, the SEC will examine them. Once they feel that 
all the registration requirements have been met, the S.E.C. issues a Notice of Effectiveness 
which effectively registers the mutual fund as an open-end investment vehicle regulated by 
the S.E.C.
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demand (investment style flows) forecasts the number of incubated funds but 
its significance and economic importance is smaller. This indicates that non- 
incubated funds seem to be the preferred mechanism utilized by fund families 
to cater to investors. This makes sense as catering with incubated funds would 
involve forecasting long-term investor demand. Moreover, if catering is mainly 
provided via non-incubated funds, catering seems to be a profitable strategy 
for families as the relative flows to non-incubated funds are higher than those 
to incubated funds (Garavito (2008)). We will further explore this point later 
in the paper.
3.3.2 Evolution of mutual funds’ book-to-m arket ratios 
after IPO
Prom Table 3.5, we see that when valuations are high, we observe a high num­
ber of new fund offerings. Our conjecture is that investors in new mutual 
funds are on average buying a portfolio of securities that is overvalued. Table 
3.6 shows that funds tend to IPO when their valuations are at their highest 
and quantifies the extend of the overvaluation. The table regresses the new 
funds’ book-to-market ratios on the age of the fund. The hypothesis is that 
as time goes by, the valuation level of the stocks held, holding everything else 
constant, decreases. We define the book-to-market ratio of a mutual fund as 
the value-weighted average of its stocks’ book-to-market ratio natural loga­
rithms. We define age of a mutual fund as the natural logarithm of one plus 
the number of quarters between the IPO date and the observation date. We 
consider all mandatory portfolio disclosures for the first 12 quarters of exis­
tence of funds in our sample. Therefore, each observation corresponds to the 
value-weighted average book-to-market ratio of a mutual fund in our sample 
reported on a mandatory portfolio disclosure date. The first column shows 
that the book-to-market of a fund increases (valuation of portfolio decreases) 
with time. However, there are many other covariates that affect the book-to- 
market ratio of a fund. It is important to control for the book-to-market ratio
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of the investment style given the mean-reverting nature of book to market ra­
tios. In other words, if a fund is launched when the book-to-market ratio of its 
investment style is low, it is natural to expect that this book-to-market ratio 
reverts back to its mean. It is also important to control for past flows since 
it has been documented that funds tend to imperfectly scale their holdings 
when facing flows (Pollet and Wilson (2008), Lou (2009)). We also control for 
fund size as funds’ liquidity management becomes more important for larger 
funds. Additionally, we control for past fund returns as equity returns and 
book-to-market ratios covary. After controlling for these variables, we still 
see that the average book to market ratio of mutual funds covaries positively 
with age. To control for fund and time heterogeneity we add fund and time 
fixed effects. The results are very similar. The economic significance is also 
important. For instance, the difference in book-to-market ratio of an average 
fund when launched and 10 quarters after is 0.028. That is 10 % of the sam­
ple average. To show that the result is not driven by the rise and collapse of 
the growth investment style in the late nineties, we run the same regression 
specification without growth funds in column 6 of Table 6. The results are 
economically and statistically similar.
3.3.3 N ew  Funds’ Risk-Adjusted Returns
Next, we investigate whether investors that rush to invest in these new fund 
offerings obtain higher risk-adjusted returns. We test this hypothesis by com­
paring the risk-adjusted return of a value-weighted portfolio of new funds and 
a control portfolio at each month-end date in our sample. Each portfolio of 
new funds is made of the new funds that were launched during each month. 
The control group consists of a value weighted portfolio of funds that are below 
of the 20th percentile of the mutual fund size distribution at each month-end 
date. This is an appropriate control as new funds are small and as mutual 
fund returns covary with size (Chen et al (2004)). We track the return of 
these portfolios for two or three years and calculate their Carhart alphas and 
betas. We repeat this process for each month in our sample. After obtaining
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Carhart coefficients for each month-end portfolio, we calculate average alpha 
and betas for funds in the IPO and CONTROL portfolios respectively. The 
results are reported in Table 3.7. Panel A and B track these portfolios for 24 
and 36 months after their formation respectively. Two facts are noteworthy. 
First, none of the portfolios has an alpha that is significantly different for zero. 
Therefore, new fund offerings do not achieve positive risk-adjusted returns. 
In other words, investors in these funds could replicate their performance by 
buying and holding passive investment instruments (i.e. buying and holding 
indices that replicate the Carhart factors). The added benefit with this passive 
strategy is the smaller fees associated with them. Moreover the difference in 
alphas of both portfolios is also not different from zero and both portfolios 
have very similar loadings on the Carhart factors. This indicates that new 
funds have very close substitutes in existence. Hence investors in new funds 
do not benefit from adding these new instruments to their portfolios as they 
do not provide different risk-return profiles than funds currently in offer.
3.3.4 N ew  Funds’ Expected Flows
So far we have seen that new mutual fund investors rush into investment 
styles that are in vogue. Fund families actively engage in providing funds 
that follow these styles. However, these new funds are overvalued and do 
not outperform comparable funds. The question that arises next is whether 
catering to investors is a profitable strategy for fund families. Funds derive 
their income from fees that depend on the level of assets under management. 
Therefore, funds that seek to increase their income will try  to attract new 
flows. Next, we study the determinants of expected fund flows to new funds. 
This will help us determine the extend to which catering benefits new funds 
and their families. More specifically, we want to see if funds that are launched 
when demand for their style is high, i.e. when catering is more likely to happen, 
experience different dynamics in their expected fund flows than otherwise. To 
this end, we regress monthly (relative) fund flows on covariates that determine 
flows (past return, past investment style flow) and on a proxy for demand.
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As a proxy for investors’ demand for an investment style, we use the average 
monthly relative investment style flow during the past 6 months. We also 
add time and style fixed effects. Our sample consists of monthly observations 
during the 24 months after the IPO. The results are summarized in Table 3.8. 
The first column shows that the expected fund flows depend on past returns 
and past investment style flows. Demand for the investment style at the time 
of the IPO does not affect the average fund flows. Column 2, however, shows 
that this demand affects the dynamics of expected fund flows to new funds. 
When demand for an investment style is high at the time of IPO, the positive 
relation between past returns and flows weakens (DEMAND X RET) whereas 
the positive relationship between past style flows and fund flows gets stronger 
(DEMAND X STYLE FLOW).
The significance of these results is different for flows in the first and second 
year after a fund’s IPO. In columns 3 and 4, we split the sample in two and 
run the same regression specification. The first sub-sample (Column 3) is the 
set of observations that takes places during the first year of existence of new 
fund in our sample. The second sub-sample (Column 4) are observations from 
the second year of the funds in our sample. We observe tha t the marginal 
contribution of past performance on capital flows to a mutual fund is lower 
in the first 12 months of a fund (DEMAND X RET coefficient is lower in the 
first part of the sample). On the other hand, the marginal contribution of 
investment style flows on net fund flows to new funds in stronger in the first 
year of a fund (DEMAND X STYLE FLOW coefficient is higher in the first 
part of the sample). A more direct test is to create a dummy variable (POST) 
that equals one for observations in the second year of a mutual fund and zero 
for observations in the first year. We see that the marginal contribution of past 
style flow conditional on investment style demand is higher in the first part of 
the sample (DEMAND X STYLE FLOW X POST is negative). The marginal 
contribution of past performance conditional on investment style demand is 
higher in the second year after the IPO (DEMAND X RET X POST). However, 
the latter effect is not statistically distinguishable from zero.
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This indicates that the marginal effect of past investment style flows on 
relative flows to new funds is increased when investor sentiment at the time 
of the IPO is high. On the other hand, the marginal effect of past returns 
on flows (the performance-chasing behaivor of mutual fund investors) is lower 
when investor sentiment is high at the time of the IPO.
3.3.5 Effect of Fund IPOs on Investm ent Style Fund 
Flows
So far, we have documented that investors invest in new funds with investment 
styles in high demand and that this strategy does not pay off for them. This 
is the dumb-money effect, i.e. money follows hot investment styles that do not 
deliver high risk-adjusted returns. However, the most important question is 
whether catering to investors’ demand, by launching pre-packaged portfolios of 
stocks that follow hot investment styles, is an important dumb-money channel. 
After all, one could argue that dumb-money would flow to hot investment styles 
even if there were no new fund IPO’s. Table 3.9 explores this issue. The idea is 
to see the effect that IPO ’s have on flows to investment styles. We regress style 
flows on the past number of new funds (natural logarithm of number of new 
funds plus one) in each style and controls (past performance, past investment 
style flows, time and fixed effects). Prom the first column we see that the 
number of funds launched in the previous 2 months covaries positively with 
the flows into their investment style. A one standard deviation increase in 
the number of funds leads to a 0.006% increase in the expected relative fund 
flows to an investment style. This increase equals 12% of the sample average. 
Therefore new fund offerings often determine the level of expected fund flows 
to investment styles. This could be due to frictions in the market for mutual 
funds (i.e. switching costs between mutual funds, mutual fund brokers’ not 
offering mutual funds in vogue, contracts between fund families and mutual 
fund brokers, investors’ search costs, etc) as it may not be easy for investors 
to access existing funds that follow popular investment styles. In the second
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column, we interact the past number of new funds and past investment style 
flows. We see that the marginal effect of past investment style flows on current 
investment style flows is higher when the number of fund launches in that style 
is higher. In other words, the number of IPOs not only increases the expected 
flows into a style, but also increases its “stickiness”
3.4 Conclusion
We show that the mutual fund industry understands its customers pretty well, 
even if it does not understand how to generate high risk-adjusted average 
returns. In contrast to the previous literature, we focus on the willingness of 
fund providers to create new funds in order to capture investor demand for 
temporarily hot styles. We show that such willingness predicts fund launches, 
except for non-opportunistic incubated funds. It is possible that a catering 
theory of mutual fund provision can explain the vast number of available funds, 
provided that some mutual fund investors never remove their money. If so, the 
population of mutual funds is the outcome of a random series of temporary 
investor demand shocks.
Prom a policy perspective, our results suggest that providing new funds 
is too easy, and that marketing considerations may reduce the welfare value 
of mutual funds, which primarily benefit investors by offering low-cost di­
versification strategies within a given style. In addition, the preponderance 
of uniformed investor flows may impose externalities on all other economic 
agents that is exacerbated by easy mutual fund provision. These externali­
ties may come in the form of payoff complementarities. If investor sentiment 
changes, uninformed investors will reallocate funds across investment styles. 
Since open-end mutual funds allow investors to redeem their shares at the 
funds current Net Asset Values (NAV) at any point in time, funds in invest­
ment styles experiencing redemptions will have to conduct unprofitable trades 
to meet redemptions. These unprofitable trades are externalities imposed by 
uninformed investors on other investors. Informed investors will know this ex-
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ante, and will try to anticipate the fund flow of uniformed investors10. This will 
induce higher volatility in flows to investment styles and thus will exacerbate 
any temporary price deviations away from fundamentals.
10This is related to the literature on bank runs and currency crises. The basic idea is that 
the last agent pulling out of a bank or a currency will bare the brunt of the losses. Ex-ante, 
all agents know this and will rush to withdraw causing financial fragility. Chen Goldstein 
and Jiang (2007) model this externalities in the context of mutual funds.
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Figure 3.1: New Funds vs S&P 500 Market-to-Book Ratio




 S&P 500 Index M/B
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics - Investment Styles
INVESTMENT STYLE B/M  is the lagged average book-to-market ratio of the cross-section of stocks that belong to investment style.
INV STYLE FLOW is investment style i’s lagged monthly fund flow. Flows are defined as flow^t — log — l°g (1 +  Ri,t)•
SP 500 B/M  is the lagged S&P 500 index’s book-to-market ratio. INV STYLE RET is the lagged value weighted average decile of 
funds that belong to investment style i  INV STYLE SIZE is the natural logarithm of the assets under management of style.
SIZE INV STYLE RET S&P 500 B/M INV STYLE FLOW INV STYLE BM
Panel A: Means and standard deviations
Mean 110878 0.79% 0.30 0.005 0.70
Standard deviation 152030 6.00% 0.06 0.018 0.56
Number of Observations 1320 1320 1320 1320 1320
Panel B: Correlations
SIZE -0.03 -0.11 -0.04 -0.39
INV STYLE RET -0.06 0.38 -0.01
SP 500 BM -0.02 -0.04
INV STYLE FLOW 0.00
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics - M utual Funds
VWA BM is the value-weighted average book-to-market of a fund at the portfolio disclosure date. AGE is the number of quarters 
between a portfolio disclosure date and the IPO date of the fund plus one. FLOW is the average monthly net fund flows to fund 
between disclosure dates. Flows are defined as in Table 3.1. INV STYLE FLOW is the average monthly net fund flows between 
portfolio disclosure dates. RET is the average monthly return of fund between disclosure dates. SIZE is the natural logarithm of 
the assets under management.
VWA BM LOG FLOW INV STYLE FLOW RET AGE SIZE
Panel A: Means and standard deviations
Mean 0.28 0.0676 0.0039 0.56% 6.77 17.63
Standard deviation 0.12 0.2720 0.0089 4.23% 3.37 1.62
Number of Observations 9533 9406 9534 9419 9534 9438
Panel B: Correlations
VWA BM -0.05 -0.17 -0.09 0.08 -0.13
LOG FLOW 0.16 0.06 -0.26 0.01





Table 3.3: Summary Statistics - New Funds’ Investment Styles
New Funds Non-incubated Funds Incubated Funds
Capital Appreciation 56 41 15
Equity Income 26 23 3
Financial Services 17 13 4
Growth 434 337 97
Growth and Income 131 96 35
Health /  Biotechnology 33 26 7
Mid Cap 142 105 37
Micro Cap 18 13 5
Small Cap 239 193 46
Science and Technology 62 53 9
Total 1158 900 258
Table 3.4: Construction of the Investment Style Book to Market Ratio
INVESTMENT STYLE OBJECTIVE STOCKS
Capital Appreciation Aggressive Growth Companies Below the 17th percentile of the book-to-market 
ratio distribution
Equity Income High Dividend Yield Above the 66th percentile of the dividend yield 
distribution
Financial Services Finance-related Companies SIC Codes between 6000 and 6999
Growth Growth Companies Below the 33th percentile of the book-to-market 
ratio distribution
Growth and Income Companies with high dividend yield and good growth Prospects Below the 33th percentile of the book-to-market 
ratio distribution and above the 76th percentile of 
the dividend yield distribution
Health /  Biotechnology Health and Pharmaceutical Related Companies SIC Codes 8011 and 8099 or between 2833 and 
2836
Mid Cap Mid-size Companies Between the 33th and 66th percentile of the market 
capitalization distribution
Micro Cap Very small Companies Below the 17th percentile of the market capitaliza­
tion distribution
Small Cap Small Companies Below the 33th percentile of the market capitaliza­
tion distribution
Science and Technology Technology Companies First three SIC Codes: 357 365 366 367 382 386 
381 481 482 484 489 737 or SIC Codes 3844 and 
3845
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Table 3.5: Determinants of Number of Funds’ IPO ’s - Poisson Re­
gressions
Dependent variable is the number of Fund IPO’s that follow investment style i at time 
t. INVESTMENT STYLE B/M is the lagged average book-to-market ratio of the cross- 
section of stocks that belong to investment style i. INV STYLE FLOW is investment style
(  X*7Vi4.' \i’s lagged monthly fund flow. Flows are defined as floW i>t =  log ( f N A 'T"i ) ~1°& (1 +  Ri,t)-
SP 500 B/M is the lagged S&P 500 index’s book-to-market ratio. INV STYLE RET is the 
lagged value weighted average decile of funds that belong to investment style i  INV STYLE 
SIZE is the natural logarithm of the assets under management of style i at time t. Robust 
z-statistics axe in brackets.
FUNDS FUNDSi FUNDSi FUNDSi NON-INCUBATEDi INCUBATEDi
Panel A: 6-Month lag
INV STYLE B/M -0.409*** -0.330** -0.409** 0.051
[-2.76] [-2.06] [-2.33] [0.15]
INV STYLE FLOW 10.604*** 9.430*** 11.982*** -1.608
[4.71] [3.62] [4.39] [-0.23]
INV STYLE RET -0.027 -0.042** 0.034
[-1.47] [-2.05] [0.92]
INV STYLE SIZE 0.465** 0.672*** -0.416
[2.33] [3.14] [-0.81]
SP 500 B/M -6.711*** 3.657* 3.533* 3.982
[-7.03] [1.87] [1.70] [0.86]
Panel A: 7-Month lag
INV STYLE B/M -0.443*** -0.341* -0.439** 0.086
[-2.98] [-1.95] [-2.32] [0.23]
INV STYLE FLOW 11.655*** 9.707*** 9.783*** 10.936*
[5.26] [3.90] [3.60] [1.80]
INV STYLE RET -0.021 -0.026 -0.001
[-1.22] [-1.42] [-0.02]
INV STYLE SIZE 0.441** 0.700*** -0.760
[2.20] [3.29] [-1.37]
SP 500 B/M -6.953*** -1.367 0.178 -7.962
[-8.52] [-0.70] [0.09] [-1.56]
Panel A: 9-Month lag
INV STYLE B/M -0.421*** -0.299* -0.433** 0.248
[-2.85] [-1.74] [-2.31] [0.66]
INV STYLE FLOW 11.781*** 10.746*** 9.948*** 15.693***
[5.46] [4.45] [3.96] [2.98]
INV STYLE RET -0.037** -0.041** -0.024
[-2.21] [-2.10] [-0.68]
INV STYLE SIZE 0.405** 0.675*** -0.904
[2.16] [3.47] [-1.60]
SP 500 B/M -6.419*** -1.033 0.592 -8.191
[-7.55] [-0.55] [0.30] [-1.64]
Investment Style Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Dollar Flows
Table 3.6: Evolution of Funds’ Average Book to Market Ratios after IPO
Dependent variable is the value-weighted average book-to-market of stocks held by fund i  at portfolio disclosure time t. AGE is the number of 
quarters between the current portfolio disclosure date and the IPO date of the fund plus one. INV STYLE BM is the average book-to-market 
ratio of the cross-section of stocks that belong to investment style i  FLOW is the average monthly net fund flows to fund i  between the 
current and previous portfolio disclosure dates. Flows are defined as in Table 3.5. STYLE FLOW is the average monthly net fund flows to in 
fund’s i investment style between the current and previous portfolio disclosure dates. RET is the average monthly return of fund i between 
the current and previous portfolio disclosure dates. Robust t-statistics are in brackets.
ALL FUNDS ALL FUNDS ALL FUNDS ALL FUNDS NO GROWTH
AGE 0.00279*** 0.00256*** 0.00411*** 0.00288*** 0.00308***
[7.528] [6.521] [11.276] [5.986] [4.486]
INV STYLE BM 0.04575*** 0.04393*** 0.02204*** 0.02060***
[19.809] [8.930] [4.328] [3.362]
FLOW 0.00081 -0.00311 -0.00358** -0.00403
[0.186] [-1.548] [-2.073] [-1.527]
STYLE FLOW -1.78229*** -0.89638*** -0.61672*** -0.64183***
[-11.725] [-7.709] [-5.780] [-5.487]
RETURN -0.06400* -0.16177*** -0.10143*** -0.07517***
[-1.743] [-8.980] [-5.392] [-3.170]
TNA -0.00834*** -0.02517*** -0.01081*** -0.01416***
[-11.126] [-12.877] [-6.268] [-5.719]
Constant 0.25961*** 0.38686*** 0.67203*** 0.51202*** 0.57804***
Observations 9118 8900 8900 8900 5146
Year. Quarter Dummies No No No Yes Yes
Fund Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes
118
Table 3.7: A verage A lp h a  an d  F ac to r L oadings for N ew  F unds
This table displays the average regression coefficients and risk-adjusted alpha 
for portfolios of funds. IPO is a value weighted portfolio of funds that IPO 
during month t. CONTROL is a value weighted portfolio of funds that are 
below the 20th percentile of the mutual fund size distribution at time t. Panel 
A tracks portfolios for 24 months after formation time t  Panel B tracks port­
folios for 36 months after formation time t. The three Fama-French factors are 
zero-investment portfolios representing the excess return of the market, Rm-Rf; 
the difference between a portfolio of “small” stocks and “big” stocks, SMB; 
and the difference between a portfolio of “high” book-to-market stocks and 
“low” book-to-market stocks, HML. The fourth factor, UMD, is the difference 
between a portfolio of stocks with high past one-year returns minus a portfolio 
of stocks with low past one-year returns, t-statistics are in parentheses.
ALPHA MKTRF SMB HML UMD
P anel A : 24 M onths after IP O
IPO 0.0097% 1.020 0.246 -0.019 0.083
CONTROL
(0.27)
0.0197% 1.012 0.251 0.007 0.069
IPO-CONTROL
(0.86)
-0 .0100% 0.009 -0.004 -0.026 0.013
-(0.30) (0.53) -(0.18) -(0.95) (1.06)
P anel B: 36  M onths a fter IP O
IPO -0.0032% 1.020 0.242 -0.038 0.078
CONTROL
-(0 .12)
0.0029% 1.015 0.230 -0.003 0.069
IPO-CONTROL
(0.21)
-0.0062% 0.005 0.012 -0.035 0.009
-(0.24) (0.31) (0.54) -(1.32) (0.82)
Table 3.8: Expected Flows and Catering
Dependent variable is the monthly net fund flow to fund i at time t. Flows are defined as in Table 3.5. RET*_i is fund i ’s  monthly net return. 
STYLE FLOWf_i is the relative monthly fund flows to fund’s i investment style. DEMAND is the average monthly STYLE FLOW in the 
6 months preceding fund Vs IPO. POST is a dummy variable equal to one if t  is between the 13th and the 24th month after the IPO of the 
fund and zero if t  is between the 1st and 12th month after the IPO. Robust t-statistics are in brackets. Standard errors are clustered at the 
fund level
FLOW FLOW FLOWpOSr=0 FLOW p o s t=  l FLOW FLOW
RETt_i 0.20359*** 0.29428*** 0.35875*** 0.20206*** 0.20269*** 0.28303***
[3.036] [4.869] [5.049] [3.440] [3.054] [4.738]
STYLE FLOWt_i 0.07609*** 0.03560 0.04997 0.04703** 0.06398*** 0.04645**
[4.134] [1.600] [1.359] [2.247] [3.642] [2.117]
DEMAND -0.00002 -0.01311 -0.01151 0.01305 0.02047 -0.00154
[-0.002] [-0.909] [-0.470] [0.766] [1.508] [-0.105]
DEMAND X RETt_i -0.72013*** -0.77473** -0.48277*** -0.61735**
[-3.543] [-2.323] [-2.856] [-2.056]
DEMAND X STYLE FLOWt_i 0.31328*** 0.28620** -0.17394 0.30393***
[3.101] [2.518] [-0.683] [3.410]
POST -0.04452*** -0.04263***
[-17.433] [-16.576]
DEMAND X RETt_iX  POST 0.04194
[0.131]
DEMAND X STYLE FLOWt_i X POST -0.50760**
[-2.279]
Style Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year.Month Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 27210 27210 13548 13662 27210 27210
R-squared 0.014 0.016 0.019 0.023 0.025 0.027
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Table 3.9: Effect of F und  IP O ’s on In v estm en t S tyle F und  Flows
Dependent variable is the monthly fund flows to style investment i  Flows 
are defined as in Table 3.5. STYLE FLOW is the monthly fund flows to 
investment style i  NEW FUNDS is the number of new funds in investment 
style i  RETURN is the monthly value-weighted average net return of funds 
that belong to investment style i  Robust t-statistics are in brackets.
STYLE FLOW* STYLE FLOW*
RETURN*.! 0.122*** 0.123***
[5.158] [5.015]
STYLE FLOW*_2 0.256*** 0.194***
[4.851] [3.609]
NEW FUNDS*_2 0.001* - 0.000
[1.789] [-0.163]
STYLE FLOW*_2 X NEW FUNDS*_2 0.086**
[2.119]
RETURN*.! X NEW FUNDS*_2 -0.002
[-0.494]
Year.Month Dummies Yes Yes
Investment Style Dummies Yes Yes
Standard Errors White White
Observations 1200 1200
R-squared 0.332 0.340
